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Heineman Ltd. Fourteenth-century pottery and ballast, including mussel shells from the North Sea, have been found in the basin. No protected havens exist today, but a certain area at the eastern shore, called Arnagrop, may once have been one. The verb is polysemous to an unusually high degree, but its use in examples as the following can be regarded as prototypical since the majority of the other uses can in a natural and systematic way be accounted for as extensions from the semantic repre- sentation underlying this use. And there are languages which have radically different tense structures, which reflect a different underlying conceptual structuring of time.
The core idea of this approach is that meanings of expressions are mental. A semantics is seen as a mapping from the linguistic expressions to cognitive structures. Language itself is seen as part of the cognitive structure, and not as an entity of independent standing.
Within cognitive semantics, the emphasis is on lexical meaning rather than on the meaning of sentences. This kind of semantics will be presented further in the following section. It is interesting to note that if de Saussure is read properly, he proposes a cognitive analysis of the signification relation. The following excerpt from the first paragraphs of the first chapter illustrates this de Saussure It assumes that ideas already exist independently of words […].
It does not clarify whether the name is a vocal or psychological entity […]. Furthermore, it leads one to assume that the link between a name and a thing is something quite unproblematic, which is far from being the case. None the less, this naive view contains one element of truth, which is that linguistic units are dual in nature, comprising two elements.
This is a point of major importance. A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between a concept and a sound pattern. However, it should be emphasized that even if de Saussure presents concepts as major elements in his definition of a sign, it does not follow that he would have endorsed the cognitive approaches to semantics and grammar that have been developed in later years.
My first aim in this paper is to present some of the main tenets of cognitive semantics. I will contrast these tenets with traditional types of semantics, but my goal is not primarily to criticize these kinds of semantics.
In the third section, I will present the bare bones of a formal cognitive seman- tics. Six tenets of cognitive semantics I shall give a programmatic presentation of cognitive semantics in the form of six tenets together with some comments. Related versions of cognitive semantics can be found in the writings of Jackendoff , , Fauconnier , Talmy , Sweetser and many others. Meaning is conceptualization in a cognitive model not truth conditions in possible worlds.
The prime slogan for cognitive semantics is: Meanings are in the head. More precisely, a semantics for a language is seen as a mapping from the expres- sions of the language to some mental entities. A consequence of the cognitivist position that puts it in conflict with many philosophical semantic theories is that no form of truth conditions of an expression is necessary to determine its meaning. The truth of expressions is considered to be secondary, since truth concerns the relation between the mental structure and the world.
To put it tersely: Meaning comes before truth. Cognitive models are mainly perceptually determined meaning is not independent of perception. Since the cognitive structures in our heads are connected to our perceptual mechanisms, directly or indirectly, it follows that meanings are, at least partly, perceptually grounded. This, again, is in contrast to traditional realistic ver- sions of semantics which claim that, since meaning is a mapping between the language and the external world or several worlds , meaning has nothing to do with perception.
Conversely, we can create pictures, mental or real, of what we read or listen to. This means that we can translate between the visual form of representation and the linguistic code. Semantic elements are based on spatial or topological objects not symbols that can be composed according to some system of rules. In contrast to the Mentalese of Fodor and others, the mental structures applied in cognitive semantics are the meanings of the linguistic expressions; there is no further step of translating conceptual structure to something outside the mind.
A conceptual space consists of a number of quality dimensions. Examples of quality dimensions are: Some of the dimensions are closely related to what is produced by our sensory receptors, but there are also quality dimensions that are of an abstract non-sensory character. The notion of a dimension should be understood literally. It is assumed that each of the quality dimensions is endowed with certain topological or metric structures.
Some quality dimensions have a discrete structure, i. Some of the quality dimensions seem to be innate and to some extent hardwired in our nervous system, as for example, color, pitch, and probably also ordinary space. Other dimensions are presumably learned. Functional properties used for describing artifacts may be an example here. Still other dimensions may be culturally dependent.
The following quotation from Langacker I am neutral in regard to the possible existence of conceptual primitives. Among these basic domains are the experience of time and our capacity for dealing with two- and three-dimensional spatial configurations.
There are basic domains associated with various senses: Emotive domains must also be assumed. However, most expressions pertain to higher levels of conceptual organization and presuppose nonbasic domains for their semantic characterization. Cognitive models are primarily image-schematic not propositional. Image-schemas are transformed by metaphoric and metonymic operations which are treated as exceptional features in the traditional view.
The most important semantic structure in cognitive semantics is that of an image schema. Image schemas have an inherent spatial structure.
They also claim that most image schemas are closely connected to kinesthetic experiences. Metaphors and metonymies have been notoriously difficult to handle within realist semantic theories. In these theories, such linguistic figures have been treated as a deviant phenomenon that has been ignored or incorporated via special stylistic rules.
In contrast, they are given key positions within cognitive semantics. Semantics is primary to syntax and partly determines it syntax cannot be described independently of semantics. This thesis is anathema to the Chomskyan tradition within linguistics.
Semantics is something that is added, as a secondary independent feature, to the grammatical rule system. Similar claims are made for the pragmatic aspects of language.
Within cognitive linguistics, semantics is the primary component which, in the form of perceptual representations, existed before language was fully developed. The structure of the semantic schemas puts constraints on the possible grammars that can be used to represent those schemas.
To give a trivial example of how semantics constrains syntax, consider the role of tenses. In a Western culture where time is conceived of as a line, it is meaningful to talk about three basic kinds of time: This is reflected in the grammar of tenses in most languages. However, in cultures where time has a circular structure, or where time cannot be given any spatial structure at all, it is not meaningful to make a distinction between, say, past and future.
And there are languages which have radically different tense structures, which reflect a different underlying conceptual structuring of time. The Chomskyan tradition within linguistics has been dominated by syn- tactic studies. Since grammars are represented by formal rules, they are suitable for computer implementations. This kind of work has indeed been the main focus of computational linguistics. Within cognitive semantics, computer-friendly representations are much more rare.
One notable exception is Holmqvist , , this volume , who develops implementable representations of image schemas and other concepts from the cognitive linguists. In his model , he also utilizes an old idea of Behaghel to generate grammatical structure solely from the va- lence expectations of different lexical items. The result is something that looks like a rule-governed syntax, albeit there is no single explicit syntactic rule in the system.
Concepts show prototype effects instead of following the Aristotelian paradigm based on necessary and sufficient conditions. However, one very often encounters problems when trying to apply the Aristotelian theory to concepts represented in natural language. As a result of a growing dissatisfaction with the classical theory of concepts, prototype theory was developed within cognitive psychol- ogy. A concept is often represented in the form of an image schema and such schemas can show variations just like concepts normally do.
This kind of phenomenon is much more difficult to model using traditional sym- bolic structures. Fundamentals of a formal cognitive semantics Here, I will only outline the first steps in developing a cognitive semantics based on conceptual spaces. According to the cognitive view, semantics is a relation between language and a cognitive structure, and I submit here that the appropriate framework for the cognitive structure is a conceptual space.
On this assumption, formulating a semantics for a specific language can be broken down into two major steps: In this section, I will discuss only the first step. Following the technical style of philosophical semantics, one can define an interpretation for a language L as a mapping of the components of L onto a conceptual space. As a first element of such a mapping, individual names are assigned vectors i.
In this way, each name referring to an individual is allocated a specific color, spatial position, weight, tem- perature, etc. Following Stalnaker The fundamental lexical hypothesis is then the following: It is well-known that different languages carve up the color circle in different ways, but all carving seems to be done in terms of connected sets. Technically, as a second element of the interpretation mapping, the basic predicates of the language are assigned regions in the conceptual space.
On this account, a possible individual is a cognitive notion that need not have any form of reference in the external world. This construction will avoid many of the problems that have plagued other ac- counts of possible individuals.
A point in a conceptual space will always have an internally consistent set of properties — since e. There is no need for meaning postulates in order to exclude such contradictory predicates. One important contrast to the traditional intensional semantics is that the cognitive semantics outlined here does not presume the concept of a possible world.
However, different location functions describe alternative ways that individuals may be located in a conceptual space. Consequently, these loca- tion functions can be given the same role as possible worlds in the traditional semantics.
This means that we can define the notion of a possible world as a possible location function, and this can be done without introducing any new semantic primitives to the theory. Some social aspects of meaning I. His argument starts from the following assumptions about meaning and mental representations, all of which seem to be accepted by the cognitive semanticists Putnam Every word the speaker uses is associated in his mind with a certain mental representation.
Two words are synonymous have the same meaning only when they are associated with the same mental representation by the speakers who use those words. The mental representation determines what the word refers to, if any- thing. Putnam claims that these three conditions cannot be simultaneously satisfied. A central part of his argument can be illustrated by the following example Putnam Is it really credible that this difference in extension is brought about by some difference in our concepts?
My concept of an elm tree is exactly the same as my concept of a beech tree I blush to confess. A related argument has been presented by Burge In contrast to Putnam and others, I claim that no reference to the external world is needed to handle the problem he presents. In other words, who are the masters of meaning? Given some rather weak assumptions concerning how the meaning of a word is determined, it can be shown that there are two basic types of power structures: When a language user is in doubt about the meaning of a locution that falls under the realm of the oligarchy, he would rely on the judgments of these experts.
This is analogous to prices in a free market — a single agent cannot decide to change the price of a product. I do not claim that all parts of the semantics of a language are governed by the same power structure. A more realistic description is to say that a language is a conglomerate of several sublanguages, each with its own conditions of linguistic power.
The semantics of the language of lawyers is determined by criteria that are different from those of the language of entomologists; which in turn are different from those used for slang expressions. He claims that the hypothesis accounts for the failures of the assumptions that knowing the meaning of a locution is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state, and that the meaning of a term determines its extension.
In particular his individual psychological state certainly does not fix its mean- ing; it is only the sociolinguistic state of the collective linguistic body to which the speaker belongs that fixes the extension. The last remark indicates that Putnam thinks of the fixation of social meaning in much the same way as in my analysis.
However, it seems as if he misses the possibility of democratic power structures, which is a different way of determining social meaning. Here, extension is, of course the set of things in the world that the word applies to. So natural-kind terms presume a realistic component for their semantics according to Putnam.
But, how do we know when something is a natural-kind term? Putnam is aware of the problem: And this is the kind of essentialist assumption Putnam needs to make in order to argue against the cognitive approach. He assumes that a term is defined in terms of realist notions in order to show that it cannot be given a purely conceptual meaning. I believe that this kind of meaning change is common in science in connection with scientific revolutions. Perhaps even clearer examples are found in the social sciences.
Linguistic modality as expressions of social power Let me finally turn to another aspect of semantics that, in my opinion, requires taking social interactions into account.
From the early works of Kripke and on, one of the major successes of intensional semantics was that it provided a formal semantics for modal expressions. However, the modals being analyzed were of an abstract philosophical nature, and hardly any attention was paid to linguistic data on modal expressions.
The objects of power are actions, for example, the action of blasting a safe. I can blast it myself, but if I have power over you, I can also command you to do it. The expression occurs typically when the speaker wants p but is uncertain whether the hearer has the same attitude.
The speaker will then, by conversational implicature, expect the hearer to understand his attitude and, consequently, perform the action p. Thus, this analysis of modal expressions is also an example of a cognitive model containing a social element. In brief, it is proposed that the primary meaning of modals is to express power relations. Within the philosophical tradition, earlier analyses of modal expressions have, almost exclusively, been based on possible worlds and relations between worlds as semantic primitives.
Indeed, the first modal notions to be analyzed were those of necessity and possibility. However, there is nothing in the structure of possible worlds semantics that is suitable for describing social power relations, but such features must be added by more or less ad hoc means. Conclusion Cognitive semantics is still rather undeveloped. Cognitive semantics has also offered new insights into the mechanisms of metaphors.
Its strength lies mainly in the analysis of lexical items, even though there are interesting attempts to explain syntactic features by cognitive means e. In this paper, I have tried to summarize the foundations of cognitive semantics in the form of six general tenets, and I have presented the skeleton of a formal cognitive semantics based on conceptual spaces.
This kind of semantics has been contrasted with the more traditional extensional and intensional types of semantics. Putnam has argued that a pure cognitive semantics, which puts meanings in the heads of individual speakers, is impossible. There are areas where traditional semantics is strongly developed and where cognitive semantics is weak, for example, quantifiers and modal ex- pression. However, I have presented a recent undertaking to supply a cogni- tive analysis of modals, again in a social setting including power relations.
Furthermore, a cognitively oriented analysis of quantifiers has recently been proposed by Moxey and Sanford Notes 1. Fodor also uses mental entities to represent linguistic information. And when it comes to the semantics of Mentalese, Fodor is still a realist and relies on references in the external world as well as truth conditions. For a discussion of the implications of this translatability for semantics, see Jackendoff and See e.
Rosch , , Mervis and Rosch , Smith and Medin , and Lakoff for extended discussions of the theory. A natural property is a convex region of a conceptual space.
A convex region is characterized by the criterion that for every pair of points v1 and v2 in the region and all points in between v1 and v2 are also in the region. The motivation for the criterion is that if some objects which are located at v1 and v2 in relation to some quality dimension or several dimensions and both are examples of the property P, then any object that is located between v1 and v2 on the quality dimension s will also be an example of P.
Relations can be treated in a similar way see Holmqvist See Lakoff The only remark in this direction isthe following: Lund University Cognitive Studies Indiana Linguistics Club. Burge, T. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. Studies in Metaphysics, University of Minnesota Press. Fauconnier, G. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fodor, J. Rantala, L. Tarasti, Philosophy of Science Possible worlds vs. Haaparanta, M. Niiniluoto, Linguistics and Philosophy 16, Charles S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Science ed. Moore, The University of Alabama Press. Synthese , Philosophy and Cognitive Science, ed. Clark et al. Philosophy, Science, and the Mind, ed.
Carrier and P. Machamer, Pittsburgh University Press. Herskovits, A. A Interdisciplinary Study of the Preposi- tions in English. Cambridge University Press. Holmqvist, K. Indurkhya, B. Syn- these Jackendoff, R. Cognition Johnson, M. The Bodily Basis of Reason and Imagination. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Kripke, S. Journal of Symbolic Logic Metaphor and Thought 2nd edition ed. Lang, E. Springer- Verlag. Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni- versity Press.
Mervis, C. Annual Review of Psychology Montague, R. New Haven: Yale University Press. Moxey, L. A Psychological Perspective. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Presses Universitaires de France. Putnam, H. In Mind, Language and Reality.
Journal of Experimen- tal Psychology: General In New Trends in Cognitive Representation: Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,. Saussure, F. Smith, E. Harvard University Press. Stalnaker, R.
Midwest Studies of Philosophy 4. Sweetser, E. Talmy, L. Cognitive Science Tourangeau, R.
Cognition 11, Winter, S. Nordic Journal of Linguistics 18, Introduction This article deals with two different, but congenial, perspectives on language description: The aim is to suggest a general formula for how the two perspectives in combination can throw light on the organization of meaning in the clause.
The proposal builds on sugges- tions made within two frameworks which have adopted these terms as brand names: This article is based on the assumption that it might be useful to attempt to clarify what the relationship is between the two approaches.
I shall begin by looking at the two central notions in a biological context. Function and cognition in a biological perspective Both function and cognition can be regarded as biologically based phenom- ena.
However, the standard uses of the two terms do not immediately qualify as foundations for scientific approaches to the study of language. I shall take the problems in turn. The problem of function as a basic concept has to do with basic assump- tions in the philosophy of science: In other words, function is only in the eyes of the beholder; in biology it is just a way of saying that certain effects have survival value.
However, there is a way to see function as an intrinsic property of the ecosystem even if we stay within the world of cause and effect. This notion of function has to do with an extra level of complication in causal chains cf. Wright that arises with reproduction and may thus be understood as coming into being at the point where we ascend from the chemical to the biological domain.
In the pre-biological world of physical and chemical processes, causes bring about effects; they may then function as causes and bring about new effects, etc. Because of reproduction, survival is not merely important in the eyes of the beholder, it is also a prerequisite for the persistence of the species as such. The fact that an animal is still around requires a different, more complex explanation than the fact that a rock is still around — regardless of what the observer may personally think of survival.
Hence, among the causal powers of an organ or behavior there are intrinsic reasons why contributions to the survival of the organism have special status. By securing the persistence of the animal, they simultaneously secure the persistence of the organ or behavior itself. In other words, functions are effects which bring about the persistence of the causal factor itself: The function of a lamp is to shed light to see by — since this is the reason why we put lamps in our rooms, it is that effect which causes the persistence of lamps.
But the definition covers more than the intentional sense: Since function comes into being with reproduction, it is present earlier and lower in the ontological hierarchy than cognition. The selectional pressure which is responsible for organ function also applies to plants and does not depend on cognitive skills. Thus, cognition must be understood within the wider context of biological function: Not only does this apply to the phylogenetic process whereby gradually more sophisticated cognitive skills evolved in the origin of species — it also applies to the ontogenetic process whereby the cognitive system of an individual develops, as argued by Gerald Edelman Functions determine cognitive organization, rather than vice versa — which reflects the fact that cognitive science is part of biology, rather than vice versa.
A broad and a narrow definition In making precise the relation between function, thus conceived, and cogni- tion, we now need to be precise about what cognition is. Under the narrow definition, cognitive processes are only those which are associated with the ability to solve problems independently of stimuli from the immediate envi- ronment.
Cognition is therefore associated with mental content and with an intentional relation between mental content and external world states; it requires an inner, situation-independent environment cf. A cognitive animal is thus one which has the ability to envisage a state of the world and let it affect its actions independently of environmental stimuli. The narrow definition remains close to the process that everybody understands as the prototype, namely the reasoning process.
The great step forward was the realization that there were things going on between input and output in human beings: There were things going on in the black box which could be scientifically investigated.
Artificial intelligence, which later developed into cognitive science, under- stood this in analogy with Turing machine states.
The nature of computational simulation as a descriptive tool made it possible to sidestep a debate on what kinds of things were involved: On this understanding of cognition, however, any mechanism mediating between input and output counts as cognitive.
Rumelhart et al. This sort of ability, however, occurs at a fairly lowly evolutionary level: It may be stimulus-controlled, and it may not even be accessible to consciousness; insects can do some of those things much better than human beings.
If we base our definition of cognition on that type of modeling and describe human cognition on that basis, it will therefore include all complex neurally based skills. Salivation at the sound of the dinner gong, sexual intercourse, and digestion would only be arbitrarily excluded from the domain of cognitive events.
All are dependent on inner mechanisms that transform input to output in a complicated way dependent on patterns of neuron firings. We will also, of course, capture those reasoning processes that stand as the prototype of cognition; but this description will fail to capture the way in which they are different from the motor skill that a dragonfly exercises when catching its prey in mid-air.
This confusion occurs if we permit ourselves to conclude from a certain skill i. Again, it may be regarded as merely a terminological issue — but there is a risk that discussion on human conceptualization will be muddled up by such a broad use. There is also a mental dimension with respect to speech sounds: From this, Langacker concludes that the expression side of language is part of the semantic subdomain b: I think this is a case of the confusion I described above: In the absence of such a sense, we cannot tell the difference between the expression and the content side of language: What is involved on the expression side, more specifically on the level of phonology, is the ability to make a certain range of perceptual distinctions as a precondition for reacting appropriately to them as a moth can perceptually distinguish the clicks of a bat and react accordingly.
Categorial perception is, of course, a distant relative of conceptualization proper, but the central theoretical basis of a semantic theory should not encompass both on an equal footing. Functional and cognitive perspectives on meaning Linguistic meaning has always been understood primarily in conceptual terms, apart from the time of the invasion of formal logic in linguistics from the s onward.
In seeing linguistic meaning in terms of conceptualization, cognitive linguistics therefore has tradition on its side cf. And with respect to the types of meaning that everybody considers basic, I think this tradition is wholly sound: However, not all meaning involves concepts.
As an example of a kind of linguistic meaning that feeds directly into the situation, one can take greetings. Rather, the meaning of hello can be described in functional terms as a signal that conveys recognition plus lack of immediately hostile intentions. The reason is that these inner mechanisms can be directly triggered by the relevant stimulus — and the concept would then only exist as a meta-level description of factors that are not in themselves conceptual, any more than a thermostat has a temperature concept.
Greeting-like signals go down quite far in the animal kingdom and have obvious evolutionary advantages with respect to avoiding unnecessary panic and fighting as well as maintaining a sense of fellowship and well-being in conspecific groups.
No inner, situation-indepen- dent environment is required to support a system of greetings. As against that, the meaning of the word horse draws on a concept inside the speaker: Cognitive types of meaning are also functional, of course: As pointed out by Karl Popper , we human beings can test out our hypotheses mentally, and let the hypotheses die in our place: Thus, all meanings are functional, but only some are conceptual in the narrow sense.
Since the processing of greetings requires discriminatory skills, the meaning of greetings is obviously cognitive in the neuro-cognitive sense. But this is not so interesting as the distinction between cognitive and non- cognitive meanings in the narrow sense.
Langacker b: This position is formulated in opposition to the then dominant view based on an objectivist, truth-conditional orientation in semantics, and emphasizes the importance of aspects of meaning that cannot be captured in a semantics based on formal logic, pre-eminently figurative language.
One basic example is the relationship of profiling, where a lexical item carves its meaning out of the domain in which it belongs; another is the structural configurations that are often central both in metaphors and in processes of bleaching, where one can demonstrate how the semantic skeleton remains while truth-conditions change.
The view of grammatical structure in CG is consciously opposed to the structure embodied in generative grammar, and places great emphasis on the individual meaning-bearing elements. This CG leaves to the speaker rather than the grammar, emphasizing the creative, problem-solving nature of the combinatory process, as opposed to the mathematical character of the generative model. Grammar involves Langacker b: However, the list approach can be preserved by the addition of rather abstract items to the list: Any plural form thus represents at least three linguistic items: This view of syntagmatic relations is essentially bottom-up.
The funda- mental assumption is that one unit can do the same as a complex unit; if, more or less accidentally, we do not have a unit that will do the job on its own, we have to build one out of existing units, cf. I can achieve appropriate linguistic symbolization only by isolating and separately symbolizing various facets of my unified conception.. There is a top-down element in the reference to a unified conception as the goal which the speaker is working towards.
The theory also provides a description of how clauses are built up that account for essentially the same elements that enter into the layered clause structure described below. How- ever, there is no clear theory of how syntagmatic combinations create ele- ments that are essentially different from elements that we find on the level of individual lexical items. Clauses inherit the profile of the verb, describing processes; noun phrases NPs inherit the profile of nouns and designate things — and this fundamental distinction is not followed up at higher levels of organization by anything of comparable status in the theory.
This I see as a consequence of the conceptualist semantics. Essentially, what we do when we combine words is to combine conceptual elements into more complex concep- tual wholes until we have something matching the unified conception that we want to convey. This explores the familiar chemical metaphor in that just as chemical compounds share electrons, so do linguistic complexes share sites in a conceptual whole.
This illustrates one of the important differences between types of items in cognitive grammar. Syntagmatic combinations are not typically between equal partners, as expressed in the distinction between autonomous and dependent constituents: One structure, D, is dependent on the other, A, to the extent that A constitutes an elaboration of a salient substructure within D Langacker b: The central example of this type of dependence is the distinction between things and relations, as reflected in the syntactic distinction between nouns as autonomous items , on the one hand, and verbs or adjectives as dependent , on the other.
Langacker states that the notion of dependence he suggests is nearly the opposite to the notion employed in dependence grammar. Instead of letting this stand as just one more source of confusion between schools, I think the oppositeness can be revealingly analyzed as a straightforward consequence of opposing points of view.
If one is interested in structure and consequently looks for the paths of determination that create clausal structure, clearly the structural position of argument terms is dependent on the main verb of the sentence. This is so for exactly the same reason as Langacker would say that the verb is the dependent member in the relationship between verb and argument noun: The type of meaning, that is, the type of dependence, described by Langacker is not the only one that plays a role in language: Before elaborating on this criticism, we shall look at the syntactic model I would like to base my own account on.
The notion of layering involves a central idea which can be illustrated by a diagram of the earth cut in half. With reference to such a picture, the earth can be described in a movement from the core outwards, such that each successive layer contains the previous layer and adds something to it. The idea is that complications can be described by successive additions to a nuclear element that remains inside the superimposed layers.
Standard examples of hierarchies include administrative organization in terms of departments with subdepartments, giving rise to a chain of command with one head at the top, executives who function as heads of their departments, and so on down to the lowest tier of employees.
The most obvious example of this in language is traditional constituent structure; generative grammar, as also revealed in the pervasive metaphor of regimentation cf. However, there is no absolute conflict between lay- ered and hierarchical structure.
When a new layer is added, this operation can be seen as creating a new constituent on a higher hierarchical level; and since there is an element of sub-layering associated with noun phrases cf. Rijkhoff , , there is more than one core item involved in clause structure, giving rise to the characteristic hierarchical configuration.
The change from phrase structure rules to X-bar syntax in generative syntax reoriented the structure in the direction of layering: In motivating the layered structure within FG, however, Hengeveld emphasizes the division into two super-layers: The interpersonal layer contains elements inspired by the speech acts philosophy, consisting of an illocution and a proposition, conforming to the formula F p cf.
Searle In the linguistic context, the notion of illocu- tion is anchored in the distinction between sentence types, centrally on the coded distinction between declarative, interrogative and imperative clause constructions.
Allwood , Harder Any adequate account of the distinction be- tween interrogatives and declaratives the distinction that will be used as the example below must include these two aspects. Similarly, the representational content of the proposition can be subdivided; there is no settled agreement in FG theory as to the precise manner in which this should be done cf.
Each of the syntactic layers corresponds to a level of semantic complexity, reflecting a gradual build-up from a property or relation up to the speech act conveyed by the utterance as a whole. The skeleton of the layered model can thus be outlined: The problem of where to put terms is due to a set of related circumstances.
However, this is difficult to reconcile with constituent order: But terms occupy a natural position at the bottom of the metaphysical as opposed to the syntactic hierarchy, by being the sole designators of individuals. In addition to describing the different layers of semantic organization in the clause, the layered model is also motivated by a series of distributional facts; for an overview cf. Hengeveld What I see as missing in the theory of Functional Grammar is an explicit semantic component.
As exemplified above, there is a wealth of semantic reflection in the theory, but it is so to speak translated into the structure. Semantic intuitions are used to motivate structures, essentially in the follow- ing manner: However, once the structural distinction is set up, there is no distinct place for the semantic information that motivated it.
Harder , ; the only place where we find separate semantic information is in relation to the lexicon. Thus, the compositional build-up of symbolic structures in CG, which also makes reference to scope relations, to some extent mirrors the layered structure, while providing in a number of cases a richer semantic apparatus to underpin it.
The point I am pursuing, however, has not to my knowledge been explicitly made in relation to either cognitive or functional approaches to clause structure. It concerns the way in which conceptual and functional elements co-operate in the clause. Human language: Let us take as an example the vervet monkey cercopithecus aethiops , which has three alarm calls: There is a conceptual element in the language, involving a distinction between three categories of predators; but the difference in relation to human concepts as involved in communication is clear.
Secondly, this combined meaning relates directly to the situation: The decisive step towards a conceptual component of language is the step from a situational-manipulative Wholese to a language with sub-utterance constituents that are not directly tied to any specific contextual function.
This involves changes in all three essential properties of Wholese at the same time. The step to sub-utterance coding by definition eliminates the holophrastic character of the language. The step to sub-utterance meanings is therefore inevitably a step towards meanings that are partially context-independent — and therefore must survive in the inner environment the conceptual world between instantiations.
The central element of creativity, i. Langacker as quoted above , is already present. By the same monumental step, we also get the necessity of linguistic structure: Since the meaning of a Wholese utterance can be described exhaus- tively in terms of direct situational function, there is little point in distinguish- ing potential from actual meaning: I shall now attempt to develop the scenario describing the transition from Wholese to sub-utterance coding and clause structure in a way that matches the layered structure.
Let me make it perfectly clear that I do not think it developed that way, and this is purely for the purpose of demonstrating the way the layered model can illustrate the result of this monumental transition. Since we start with the Wholese signal, the natural expository path is top- down. The first distinction, as we have seen, is one between an indication of illocutionary type and a propositional content.
In the evolutionary perspective, this step would be accomplished if some band of ancestors once developed a system where there were differentiated reactions to potential threats: More humanoid, we might also have interrogative illocution, usable in case of doubtful identification of the predator.
Snake, etc. In the example given above, a snake would still mean a snake in the situation; in human language this is not necessarily so. Harder ; clauses in the past tense are understood as applying to the past world of which we are speaking, whereas clauses in the present tense apply to the world as it is at the time of speech.
The central point is that the descriptive content of a clause in itself cannot be true or false of anything. In this, it is like a picture hanging on the wall, showing, for instance, a sturdy fisherman smoking a pipe. It makes no sense to ask whether this picture is true or false, unless we see it as an attempt to portray a particular person. The deictic tense codes this element of application, in essential simi- larity to definiteness as expressed in a noun phrase: Apart from its use in feature-placing sentences and as part of a thing-concept, there is the role associated with the central predicate of a predication.
In this role, the concep- tual content is conceived in relative independence of things cf. Obviously, the complications of differentiated coding are vastly greater than the basic lay-out of the layered model as outlined here can even begin to hint at; it unfolds ultimately into the whole of linguistics.
The point I hope to make here is just that coding differentiation, with holophrases as the point of departure, is a revealing approach. In order to be more explicit about the distinction between functional and conceptual aspects of meaning, I shall pick out a couple of examples below — but clearly they must stand as, hopefully, reasonably central illustrations of some general principles rather than anything more ambitious. A closer look at functional meaning The notion of communicative function that is important in relation to the point of this article can be described in continuation of the discussion of the situational nature of holophrastic languages, where meaning always relates directly to the situation.
We now need to look at the role of the situational relation in human language, once conceptual meaning begins to arise. Among the representatives of this type of meaning in human language I shall take deixis, which is perhaps the most obvious example, as a demonstration ex- ample. The central point in this context is that, from the point of view of situational, interactive function, they do NOT change.
As a result of the coding differentiation, it is not a complete message except in special circumstances ; but it preserves that situational link which purely conceptual meanings lack. In CG, there are two related notions which account for the peculiarities of such elements: Subjectification is the process whereby meaning elements become re- oriented from the objective scene to the subjective scene, as often occurs in processes of grammaticalization, cf.
Langacker More technically, grounding and subjectification involve a special type of profiling: Within this picture, the pronoun I can be described as invoking the subjective rather than an objective domain; it refers to the speaker as a participant in the speech event itself, rather than a speaker viewed as part of an objective scene.
However, there is no func- tional, interactive dimension in this picture. What is missing is the actual process of establishing a link between the ongoing situation and the conceptualization process in the mind - the element that was automatic at the holophrastic stage.
The distinction is analogical to the difference between having a fully functional electrical device and plugging it in; the interactive element is the element of actually plugging the utterance into the situation. The word here invokes the ground and points to where the speaker is; the word there invokes the ground and points away from the speaker. But before one has achieved, by evolution, the cognitive level where one can make this generalization, only pointing is available — so a purely conceptual account of pointing is an account based on the hindsight of evolutionary superiority.
Essentially the same element is involved in the account of definiteness. In conceptual terms, cf. Thus, an NP with a definite article, as in the ferry, designates a ferry satisfying the three conditions described above.
The element that is missing according to the functional perspective is the establishment of a link between the conceptual ferry and the situational ferry. This link is not conceptual — a concept can never get us beyond the conceptual world - but an act of opening the door for a concrete, situational element to be referred to by means of the conceptual construct.
The definite article does not predicate a concept — it triggers an action. Another example of interactive meaning types is the words yes and no. Both constitute complete speech acts, and the speaker by using either of the two indicates his own position with respect to something in the situation: In comparison with deixis, these are clearer cases of purely interactive, situational meaning, because they do not designate or denote anything — they only function as signals of assent or negation.
Viewed in isolation from a concrete instance, no conceptual content can plausibly be assigned to them, even in relation to a subjectively construed grounding situation. One might hypothesize a developmental path for negation that mir- rors the evolutionary scenario above. A likely source situation for negation is the desire to reject something one does not like: However, no!
The analysis suggested by Langacker is again perfectly convincing as an analysis of the conceptual aspects involved in understanding negation. His analysis sets up an understanding where the point of departure is the un-negated item, which is then contrasted with a configuration where the item is absent.
To illustrate this account, a parallel is suggested with the analysis of the preposition towards, which evokes a completed path but only designates the unfinished trajectory. Just as with negation, we need a situation to compare with in order to understand the conceptual import. However, I think the complexity of negation is different from the com- plexity of towards.
This word designates part of a trajectory, essentially as a hand designates part of an arm. Negation, by contrast, does not designate either the item itself, or the missing item, or the pair consisting of both. What happens is better described by a word that Langacker uses repeatedly in the context, namely cancellation: The word cancel might suggest that the description is simply withdrawn, but what happens, as argued at length in Millikan , is rather that a description is replaced by an alternative description — which can be captured by saying that not is used to reject a description, essentially as no!
And data from language acquisition would appear to be compatible with an assumption that the interactive element is still basic in negation: In relation to FG, what I say can be seen as an attempt to make the functionality of the layered model more transparent. The layered structure describes one way of factoring out subcomponents of meaning, in which the uniqueness of human language consists in its tapping conceptual resources, but without eliminating the situational embedding of communication.
Situational and conceptual aspects are thus both part of human language. Both production and reception of utter- ances are likely to work by parallel processing, so no simple compositional process is psychologically realistic; but as pointed out by Dik If that is the case, we can add a sub-scenario whereby the meanings involved in the layered structure specify cognitive routines that addressees must somehow perform: Thus, human language works interactively, by enabling addressees to recon- struct cognitive representations inside their own heads, rather than by simply transmitting pictures directly from brain to brain.
Functional and conceptual dependence Function is almost by definition something that must be described top-down.
As with the function of an organ, the function of an utterance must be described by seeing the object of investigation in relation to the context in which it belongs.
The function of sub-utterance items must similarly be described by a top-down procedure of the kind followed above: This approach provides a perspective on dependence that is different from the one described by Langacker.
The basic motivation for it is that one linguistic element needs another because it cannot do the whole job on its own; when you code a sub-utterance item, there is always something missing before you have a fully functional utterance. On the basis of this dichotomy, we can set up two complementary types of incompleteness, giving rise to two types of dependence relations. The incompleteness of operators consists in the lack of a content to operate upon.
Starting from the top, we began by differentiating between the illocution for example, declarative or interrogative and the propositional content. The illocution operator specifies function, for example, that the utterance is a question, but in isolation it would lack a content.
With a slight overgeneralization, I shall call the dependence of an operator upon its operand conceptual dependence. The motivation for this name is that the dependence points downward in the structure, towards the conceptual end, and that what is missing therefore includes the conceptual content. The overgeneralization is due to the fact that there may be something else apart from conceptual content missing. The operand is incomplete in the opposite way. What is missing is a specification of what to do with it — in the example we have a proposition, but we do not know whether it is to be used to make a statement or ask a question.
Therefore the dependence of operand upon operator will be called functional dependence. The incompleteness, and the dependence, only arises when it is invoked in connec- tion with an utterance, i. It follows from the definition that operators below the top level are dependent in both ways: It also follows that all operands are conceptually independent in relation to the operator. The billiard-balls example covers the relationship between the predicate and the arguments in creating a SoA: But I think the same basic facts are involved.
From the point of view embodied in the approach from above, the conceptual content of individual items must be seen in relation to a division of labor: To take two examples: With respect to the relation between verb and arguments, the verb is dependent because it involves a trajector and possibly landmark site that requires elaboration. Seen from below, we get the picture argued by Langacker: Seen from above, we can say that the fact that not is designed to reject something which functions as its operand means that in using not one is simultaneously presupposing an operand to operate on.
In other words, conceptual and functional differentiation are two sides of the same coin in creating word meanings. The notion of functional dependence is, however, absent in CG. It is not explained why the billiard-balls are incomplete as the content of an utterance — why full utterances in the form of noun phrases are deviant; or, more generally, why all layers up to the illocution are incomplete from a functional point of view we find no free-floating predications or propositions either.
Both types of dependence have traditionally been handled in terms of dependence between linguistic items alone. Sometimes this is the case; but typically the picture is less clear-cut.
The dependence is basically between meanings, and meanings may be situationally present in such a way that items that are not functionally complete can nevertheless occur on their own. As long as what is missing in an elliptic utterance can be specified in precise linguistic terms, it makes no great difference to think of the depen- dence as linguistic.
An interesting borderline case is zero anaphora cf. In the terms described above, one would say that the basic dependence is from a verb meaning to a meaning elaborating its trajec- tor.
In languages like English, the dependence in most situations manifests itself linguistically in the need for an NP; in Spanish or Mandarin Chinese, the dependence manifests itself in a drawing upon previously introduced refer- ents, in a manner that is very like pronominal reference cf Tomlin The mechanism by which a more or less linguistic enrichment of meaning takes place in virtue of the slot into which an utterance is inserted is the same as we find in the case of selectional restrictions giving rise to metaphors.
Two possible ways of keeping language purely cognitive There are two ways in which the theory that meaning is entirely distinct from communication might be upheld even in agreement with the basic picture I have outlined.
First of all, it would be compatible with the evolutionary scenario to have a language with purely conceptual, de-contextualized mean- ing — provided that all the work of plugging meaning into the context was left to the inferential abilities of the speaker. This would imply that function was not coded in human language at all, but left solely to inferential, pragmatic interpretation — or, alternatively, left to the paralinguistic system that we have essentially inherited from the apes.
Language would then feed descriptive, conceptual meaning into the situation without any indication of how it was to be related to the situation. This view is extremely resilient: There is a deceptive plausibility about this picture which is due to the fact that the functional, situational types of meaning are by their nature the most easily inferable.
It is not typical to be able to guess the conceptual concept of the next utterance — but the nature of the situation may constrain its situational function considerably. This means that if a clever addressee gets the right content words, he can do the job of organizing them and assigning a situational function to them on his own.
This is why Schank on behalf of the AI community can say that he can do virtually without syntax, managing everything by inference schemas. That this is communicatively feasible even with a limited vocabulary is exemplified by the tourist situation. And some languages do not code deictic tense, or definite articles. Exactly how the functional dimension manifests itself is a matter of language-specific organization of meaning; but indications specifying the situational application of the conceptual meaning are always present to some degree.
Since this does not in any way detract from the centrality of the conceptual richness of language, I see no reason to exile the situational embedding from the basic picture of human language.
Another way of demonstrating the points of relatedness between human language and pre-cognitive types of communication is to look at holophrastic types of linguistic communication, such as greetings. This overlap can be seen as one way in which human language does not stick to its privileged territory of conceptual meaning, but is used also for communicative purposes that can be understood in terms of pre-cognitive stages of development.
The idea is that language must be entirely explicable in terms of cognitive process simply in virtue of the fact that nothing that plays a role in language can do so outside the cognitive apparatus of a human language user. Where understanding stops, language must stop. I regard this as trivially true. In this sense, language is a cognitive phenomenon just as seeing the Taj Mahal, fighting in the Second World War and playing football are cognitive phenomena: If the word is to be sensibly contrasted with anything, however, I think it is better to narrow it down to cover mental phenomena as distinct from external events.
This would be the complementary error of behaviorism: It is probably true that once cognition is there, it interferes with everything; but this does not imply that cognition is all there is. If we tentatively distinguish between events in the mental world and events in the external world, we have to add that what we understand as the external world is something also created by means of cognitive processes — which might seem to bring us back to square one.
Inability to distinguish between the two types of events is the crucial criterion of insanity. Relating to the situation around you is therefore very different from playing around with possibilities on the mental level only; and linguistic meaning covers both types of activity. Conclusion It is now time to gather the threads in the argument. The general picture should now have become clear.
These later fish- ing camps were more or less abandoned for most of the winter, or from late autumn to true spring. The permanent fishing settlements were a very sparse and late phenomenon, specific to certain areas, e.
Near-fishing, satellites of permanent agrarian settlements, fishing mainly for house- hold needs. Remote fishing: Town fishing: Professional fishing: Part-time fishing: Leisure fishing site: Nowadays it may be within the confines of buildings of an old fishing camp once representing one of the other categories. It seems obvious that a demand for an independent chapel only existed in 2a, 2b and 3, but the local conditions have varied considerably.
In Norrland the class divisions were evident among the remote-fishing town burghers, near-fishing peasants and coast-dwelling small-holders. These divisions influenced the distribution and the appearance of the chapels. The size of the camp was also important. The chapel had to mean a considerable investment by its users. This is only one of the sets of variables possible. There are many regional and transitory variations in all the countries treated, in Sweden as well as in Finland, Norway and Denmark.
Martin was kept. Later the chapels served many different purposes. They could be erected as sites of penance, where a murder had taken place, especially that of a king or other prince, of pilgrimage for votive acts at a holy spring.
They could also be annexes to the parish church in the peripheries of the congregation, at a hospital most often devoted to St. George, St. In more southerly places a chapel could contain a baptistery. But perhaps the dominant function was to serve mobile people, travellers along the roads, the sea-routes and among the fishermen in the skerries.
Mats Anglert23 categorizes medieval chapels as 1 capelle non curate, chapels without priest, i. A fishing chapel could in some sense be considered in all three cate- gories and at the same time. They are usually quite small and built of logs dovetailed at the corners.
The foundation may only consist of a row of stones to support the bottom logs, and in some cases only of four corner stones. Such buildings could survive from the Middle Ages into modern times in forested inland valleys, but if placed out in the skerries and exposed to all the forces of an austere nature fig. Thus, the meagre remains of such chapels are usually very difficult to discover. Once fallen into disuse their timbers were already in great demand for re-use in nearby camp huts.
People could easily remove a few stones, and would probably have been eager to do so if very few stones were available. In exceptional cases we find regular stone buildings, but most often they are ruined, rebuilt into other shapes, and even completely eradicated e.
Chapels in the skerries were not just ritual places for devotion. They could serve other purposes as well. We only know something more in detail about them from Post-Reforma- tion times.
Thus they gradually acquired new meanings, both in a local sense and in the context of navigation. The first meaning was economic. The parish priests and the bishops could potentially obtain a large and important income from a fishing chapel. This income derived from fish- ing tithes and payment for services, including gifts to the preachers, from the fishing community involved.
In Denmark there were no archipelagos. Fishing took place at the shore of the parish and the parish church served both fishers and peasants all year. This order reflects a more continental pattern than that in most of Scan- dinavia.
Much of the fishing in Denmark was based in the coastal cities, which were rather densely placed in comparison with those of the rest of Scandinavia. The second was storage. In medieval Norway the equipment of the levy fleet ship could be kept in the parish churches preferably in the attic , according to the provincial Gulathing law. The later fishing chapels at the Baltic were small in comparison but they were as a rule used for storage as well during the winter when the harbours were totally deserted.
Nets, the boat riggings, their sails and even boats could be stored in the chapel. The booths or cottages of some fishermen may have been too small or too easily entered by strangers. Often they were kept open and accessible for emergency reasons — for shipwrecked sailors. The chapels were locked and the key taken away and sealed with wax. Of course a chapel which was open and could be visited all year could not be used for stor- age, so this resource was probably used only in parts of the ice-covered Baltic.
Goods that needed to be hidden so as not to attract the attention of crown officials could be brought into the chapel as well. The year appears to be inscribed in the chapel and has been preserved as a traditional foundation year. The door, marked on the inside and , is massive.
Lots of valuables were stored here, fishing gear, sails, tar etc. The unbroken seal of the big iron key was the object of the first ceremony at the return of the fishermen in late spring or early summer. Olle Homman , from Granlund Especially the principle of winter storage in chapels was valid for some remote boat teams.
For this reason they had made their own sea-booths too small for storage. The third secondary function of the fishing chapels was that of sea marks. On the windswept skerries, at least in the northern Bothnian, without dense vegetation to conceal them, these buildings clearly stood out against the sky and the sea.
In fact, they were supposed to be remembered and also depicted exactly as they were; naval authorities discouraged any change in their appearance. Counterparts to these are, above all, churches and their towers, to some extent also windmills at the coast.
Thus, it was not just the law and order preached during the services that made the chapel important for the authorities. It became itself the symbol of social ideals among the fishermen themselves and their families.
It was usually the sound of the bell of the chapel which started everyday work and the precise moment for the rowing-out utrodd. Most medieval parish churches were donated by wealthy people, founded by and belong- ing either to the aristocracy or to peasantry with considerable means. Some medieval chapels seem to conform to the same pattern. But for most we lack any information on the source of the chapel. Some were very likely independent creations.
In Lutheran times the fishermen themselves often established the chapels themselves. They had then to write a letter to the ecclesiastical authorities, who were responsible for the provision of clergymen even to seasonal establishments. Among these was also a woman. The work was probably done by contracted carpenters in the local village. The chapel was conse- crated 10th July, The distance to the parish church is often mentioned as a good reason to apply for a chapel, especially if it was too far for the community to get back to camp the same day.
Oldsters had problems getting there anyway. It was considered unworthy of divine services to be performed in a sea-booth with pungent smells of tar and rotten fish, or in the open air, although this was quite common at small sites.
A famous painting by the Finnish artist Albert Edelfelt — gives a moving first-hand picture of an open-air service in the skerries of Nyland, Southern Finland, in the s fig. Apparently it was thought important to apply for a separate building since many of the fishermen were strangers. If there was no chapel they had to go to the Sunday service in the local parish. Strangers would have to be seated at the benches farthest back in the parish church, together with the poor.
The landed farmers to whom in many cases the lease for the harbour was paid disposed of the more desirable seats closer to the altar. Divine services in the archipelago of Nyland, Finland, The painting conveys a congenial tone emphasizing the simplicity and honesty of fishing people at the fringe of the sea of eternity.
Ateneum, Helsinki ants. All these motives would either be explicit, or to be read between the lines in applications.
Finally, chapels in the skerries served as monuments, as did parish churches. Unlike the churches, however, they were not monuments and markers only of the authorities and the upper classes in society,30 but also of the humble practitioners of maritime culture, and could thus be seen as signs of their common social identity.
The Graves of Strangers The ritual demands of the people using the archipelagos were mainly two. One was the chapel as a place of regular devotion.
The other was the need for a consecrated burial place. Often both went together. The chapel was normally surrounded by a round, oval or angu- lar stone fence Swed.
A burial ground did not need to have a chapel.
Usually the ground was marked by a cross or some other devotional monument. In contemplating the latter case we should always remember that all normal burials took place at the parish church of the deceased. This was valid for fishermen and sailors as well. The fishing chapel for an exclusively local community was just an annex to its parish church.
There was no need for a special graveyard at the chapel. Nor did any chapel, as mentioned before, de origine possess official burial rights. But it should also be noted that if a person who came from a remote place died at a fishing harbour his or her family might insist on a permanent burial in this locality instead of bringing him or her home after the fishing season.
Exceptionally, there could of course have been separate mass-graves during plagues or during wars. But if we meet separate grave-yards for individuals in the archipelagos it is likely that they are the graves of strangers, e.
The harbour in question was also very likely a harbour for strangers. A ship might also have had a single crew member who had died on board in a harbour or haven and had to be disposed of immediately. The fear of contagion was always present. How were anonymous corpses found on the beach recognized and sorted out as those of strangers?
An illustration of this dilemma is found in the medieval Borgarthing law of Norway. If an unknown person had his or her? They believed, however, that their ghosts could not pass water. Any shore was thus a liminal place. This means that island graveyards for anonymous burials were preferred.
In islands the shore situation was optimal. To be able to use such a place the burial rights had to be established. A strict delimitation and formal consecration of the area, both by way of the church, had to follow.
Thus the limits laid out by a wall were absolute. No burials were allowed to take place outside of it. The wall enclosing it had to be maintained at all times. Although temporary graves were dug and cairns built where corpses were found they were more or less illegal, always meant to be just temporary, their remains supposed later to be re-interred in such an endorsed burial place. It was believed that otherwise ghosts would haunt the site for ever.
All the same it had to happen now and then that temporary burials became permanent. The need for a proper ritual was a decisive factor in death as well as in life. But, as we know from tradition and shall see later in this text, it was thought likely that even consecrated burial sites could be haunted.
A site made with some respect paid to individual graves and marked could look like fig. Introduction to the Locations of Chapels It is supposed here that a large number of maritime chapels were built in the archipelagos of the North during the High and Late Middle Ages 14th to midth centuries. This idea is justified by the fact that there was a clear economic boom in fishing.
This is the period after the Black Death c. AD It is also that of strict enforcement of Lent, formally in place already since the Lateran Council of AD , and a concomitant international market for fish as the most desirable food for Lent. The date given above has however seldom been proved at the individual sites. The over- whelming majority of the chapels preserved today were presumably built c. Some may, however, be from the last part of the Middle Ages up to and the last part of the 16th century.
As I have already indicated, in writing this text on chapel sites I hope to inspire more precise dating by way of dendrochronology and to encourage search for likely sites, supposedly medieval, without preserved buildings. A comparative perspective such as this has never been attempted within this immense area.
Striking points of agreement will be discovered, especially within the areas chosen. Most chapels were directly attached to seasonal harbours, presumably either for fishing or for shipping, and some for both. The islands I discuss in the Baltic present day Sweden and Finland were inhabited only during the ice-free seasons of the year.
Some of those situ- ated in Norway with ice-free waters all year could be used by a few families during winter as well, although many were exclusively seasonal. The main emphasis here, as mentioned in certain cases, starts with the coast of Norrland, Northern Sweden, and Finland. Southern Norway is covered to some extent in detail. But what is important is that my ambition is to discuss the entire Nordic area. Some of the medieval harbours continued to be used for a long time.
Their chapels may have been used, moved, reused or rebuilt far into Lutheran times. During the 17th and 18th centuries, after the Reformation, an even larger number of fishing chapels were built or rebuilt, certainly hundreds.
I am most familiar with those on the Swedish northern side of the Baltic, in the middle parts of the Bothnian Sea. Some of them may have medieval roots. The archipelagos of Finland have a number of chapels which seem to have a combined background of seafaring and fishing.
These chapel sites therefore could appear to have served shipping rather than fishing. Proving this in separate cases is however an unsolved problem. Within the borders of medieval Denmark there are few of this island type of chapel, simply because the definition of a Scandinavian archipelago does not apply here. But exist- ing coastal chapel sites, probably with similar functions, have to be covered to some extent, if only for the sake of comparison.
The area, or at least parts of it, has a number of separate burial sites for drowned sailors or oral traditions of such, including cholera grave-yards from the 19th century.
Some of these possibly had a chapel as well and may thus be older than the assumed purpose merely of burial would indicate. I will sketch types of indications of unknown chapel sites, such as oral tradition and place names as well as the position of these sites and their possible harbour remains, both above and under water.
There are generally many cases where oral traditions have been substantiated for churches and chapels from Catholic and later times in the North. Thus, it is likely that a considerable number of chapel sites have not yet been discovered.
In order to find sites as yet unexplored a number of survey methods have been set up. A very important element is place names. Their significance lies in the fact that they may indi- cate the ritual activity, a building or a churchyard.
Names seemingly indicating a chapel or church could refer to something resembling a church, e. In fact, legends and fairly recent free- church practice confirm that such places may have been used for divine services. On the other hand, such genuine names may also be explained in myths and popular tradition by reference to such practices explanation tales , rather than to an actual chapel. The name elements of current interest for churchyards would be e.
Mostly an island, islet, skerry or holm is indicated. Sometimes their later background may be referred to in local tradition as a special burial ground set aside for victims of cholera or other epidemics. This background may be correct, but it is obvious that the burial ground may be far earlier than that. A place name containing a reference to a church may have had many other implications.
I agree, but I want to point out that this also could to some extent be an open question. I have myself emphasized earlier48 that a connection could rather be sought in the ownership of a specific parish church or the Church as a whole, as an institu- tion, the road to a church building, and at the sea as a mark of direction to such a church or its tower, where a transit line could be drawn for purposes of navigation.
Tradition may also have changed the mean- ing. Perhaps later tradition knew little of the background which once denoted a very simple installation, e. But outside Stavanger, Western Norway. It has the cross could have been a sea mark or a been surmised that the consecrated sites of market cross.
In my recent text on sea marks49 these crosses were sometimes used for open- I have pointed out that the first Norse term air divine services.
See Birkeli and Gabrielsen On the other hand, an individual burial or a Photo: Endre Elvestad, Museum of Sta- burial ground may be the background of such vanger a cross. Cross-roads may be denoted as well. There are other possibilities as well. The Norwegian archaeologist A. In Vest-Agder, Southern Norway, another tradition has pointed to another cross with the same function in front of the parish church of Harkmark. There is a site called Krossen, the cross, in Kjerkehavn, Hidra.
In the West after AD calvaries and crosswalks were built. These had the name kalvarieberg. In these installations the stages of the Passion of Christ were revived. People walked in a miniature topographic model of the Golgotha rock instead of making a regular pilgrimage to Jerusalem. The stages of this walk were usually marked by some simple roof-clad building and several crosses.
Most of these calvaries were found in the centre or the peripheries of cities, e. Apart from that, fines for offences against the regulations of the fishing camp harbour Swed. It certainly worked as a church for a considerable time after that. The ruins of the church and some other buildings have been excavated fairly recently.
Their later function was presumably to shelter travellers who wanted to cross the lake. This route was part of a regular ferrying system in the 17th to 19th centuries.
According to oral tradition a poor-box had been installed here and was in active use by sailors as late as the 19th century. Poor-boxes are known in tradition from several other places along the Swedish Norrland coast, especially in rest harbours or emergency havens.
However, there is so far no known connection to any chapel site in the immediate vicinity. The Saintly Landscape The Gospels gave a secure foundation for a special cognitive place for fishermen in the Christian world. All the Gospels record it. The meaning is that the last shall be the first, and the simplest people will be raised to the top, also from an eschatological point of view.
There was thus hope for fishermen as a group. They were chosen by the Saviour himself. The first Apostles of Jesus were the fishermen at the Sea of Galilee. Two of them were to be Evangelists, of which one, St. Peter, was later to be seen as the Leader of the Church, together with St. The first summoned were the fishing brothers Andrew and Simon Peter, some say in that order, and the other pair of brothers, James and John Matth.
They responded as one man and without hesitation: Luke mentions that after the interces- sion of Jesus so much fish entered the nets that they burst and the boats started to sink fig.
This might once have been quite a potent sign to people if the boats were of the size and quality displayed by the contemporary boat wreck found at the kibbutz Genosar at the Sea lake of Galilee. The iron fish spear used on larger fish appears somewhat irregular. Christer Westerdahl, the fear of sinking in rising waves speaks for itself. The sudden and extremely violent storms on Lake Tiberias or Gennesaret were a function of the heavy down-falling kata- batic winds to ft below sea level.
John is the only Gospel that does not provide a fishing context for the first Apostles. On the other hand St.
John has, like the others, the miraculous episode where Jesus walked on the water John 6: These stories must have played a large part not only in preaching but also probably in the imagery within the chapels. Undoubtedly, these texts and pictures influenced in more than one way the cognitive worlds and daily life of the summer camps of fishermen and their families.
References to fishing, fishermen and fish abound in later Christian imagery. The Apostles were the Fishers of Men. This fish imagery is already found in writings by the church father Tertullian c. AD — Peter wears the fisher ring, the annulus piscatoris. One of the most prominent symbols of Christ himself was a fish, Greek ichtys.
In many cases a conflation of languages and several abbreviations have worked. Fish were not doomed in the Deluge, and were permitted as food for Lent, etc. The foremost protector of fishermen in the Christian world including the North was always the Virgin Mary. This tradition carried on well into Lutheran times. Mary and any maritime — or other — saint. Since archipelago chapels were small and very simple, there was seldom room for more than one altar.
But effigies of other intercessors between man and God could certainly be on the timber walls. Chapels were called after a saint, to whom they were dedicated. There could also be several saints invoked, but usually only two in the name of a chapel Lat.
Could a remembrance of the saint s invoked in a chapel be found in local place names? Of course, most of them were simply personal names of peasants owning this ground. Names like St. Olof,70 St. Martin, Jan or Jon for Johannes, St.
John, would be obvious choices. Another common name was that of St. Clemens, by its Nordic name form s Klemme n t. These terrain names are seldom thought of as being connected with chapels or similar places of devotion, but could very well be. And as we shall see there are many other possible saintly names.
As far as I have been able to trace in patrocinia dedications for individual churches and various preserved wooden sculptures, paintings etc. It is probable that remains of their names or legends are preserved in local myths and popular and oral traditions.
Their attributes and insignia may also explain archaeological material at the sites of the chapels. References in place names form one of the possible ways to locate earlier unknown medieval Catholic sites at the coast. The saints are often, but not exclusively, symbolized and represented by ships or ship- related items. Sometimes their names are used for islands and capes, obviously to give protection at sea.
Here, the choice of saints will necessarily be restricted to about forty-five I have included a short background for most of them. Of course the char- acter of the Catholic Church and its clergy was international. The saintly world of Legenda aurea, The Golden Legend, of Jacobus de Voragine, a Genoese priest — must have been known, although the list of the saints in his stories is not exhaustive, even for the Mediterranean.
There seem to be few of the less well known kind invoked in lowly archipelago chapels but surprises do occur. Since their individual festival days could be of interest to certain interpretations I have marked most of these as well: Apostle and originally fisherman at Tiberias. Anna Anne. Her name is found in the archipelago parish of S: During the Middle Ages it was known as S: In Bornholm, Denmark, we also find the chapel of St.
Anne at Sandvig. Anthony of Padua. Franciscan monk, —, also known for having preached to the fish of the river Brenta near Padua. He is also the patron saint of the ship- building town of Papenburg at the river Ems in Germany. The great enemy of the heresy of Arianism and exiled at least 5 times.
While in Rome he introduced monasticism from the east Egypt. During church conflicts and persecutions he escaped in a boat on the Nile. Probably not likely in the North. Brendan — A legendary Irish founder of monasteries, famous above all for the Navigatio Sancti Brandani, recounting his miraculous journey to the unknown waters of the West, the theme revived as an experiment by Tim Severin76 in our time. See St.
Malo St. Maclovius, below. According to legend he was the giant Carrier — in the guise of a small child he bore the Christ across a river e. Invoked by pilgrims, travellers, ferrymen.
A picture of him was often found at the entrance of parish churches, since it was believed that merely gazing at it protected people from death during that day. Inland he sometimes took over the functions of St. An early Christian saint and pope. According to his legend, in AD , he was thrown into the sea with an anchor around his neck.
He was buried in the ancient church of San Cle- mente in Rome. A patron of Rhine skippers and also of skip- pers at the Baltic, of divers, sea people in general, light houses and their attendants. Quite a likely choice for a fisherman as well. He was popular in me- dieval name-giving in north- ern Sweden, in later days not least among the Saami. Columba Colmkille of Iona. Irish saint, 6th century AD. He was invoked to get good sailing winds. Little known in the North. Died c. He is depicted with a Fig.
Christopher in the church of capstan and hawser. This Vamlingbo, Gotland. There are many paintings in churches symbol was often misunder- depicting the motive of the Carrier of Christ. The popular stood inland and was seen as a belief was that a glimpse of it preserved your life for that ball winder, and a new legend particular day. Chapter Christer Wester- tortured before his death as a dahl, martyr.
Often used as protection against lightning. He is supposed to be the name-giver of the St. Elmo Lights St. He is also associated, in Portugal for example, with the mast-tops and rigging of sailing vessels. These however, also could be associated with Peter the Martyr, below. Francis of Paola — Franciscan hermit and founder of his order, but only in later times one of the patron saints of shipping. Probably too late for the Catholic North.
Francisco Xavier — Jesuit missionary in Japan, China and India Goa. Too late for the Catholic North. Gertrud e of Nivelles. Died AD The chapel was a votive church lovekirke , where various votive gifts were deposited by sailors, situated at an old harbour, called Lousont by Dutch sailors in the 16th century onwards. From Wikander invoked against rats, since people associated her with ships because of ship rats.
In Holland it was customary to drink to her from a tankard formed like a ship before setting sail. In Sweden the temples of S: In this list St. Norwegian saint, born c. Associated with maritime chapels in Norway. In Sweden often invoked together with St. Botvid below: Both have a comparatively local identi- fication. They are also associated with passages in boats. Henrik Henry. The patron saint of Finland, a bishop of English origin, suffered martyrdom after the partly legendary Swedish first crusade across the Baltic to Finland, commanded by King Erik Jedvardsson, St.
Eric, the patron saint of the realm of Sweden and of Stockholm , c. Examples are found on altar pieces, and the ceno- taph of the church of Nousis Nousiainen Finland dated AD Due to his official status he is perhaps an unlikely choice for a simple fisherman.
James Jacob. He is the great pilgrim, but also the patron of La Reconquista. The ship is sometimes illustrated in connec- tion with this great pilgrimage site and with la concha de Com- postela, the shell, as symbol. He is mainly known as a pilgrim in the North in the Gothic period, with a Danish wall painting as an example. Joachim, see St. The pair Anna and Joachim was customarily illustrated by two doves. Johann John of Nepo- muk.
Nicolaus of Myra and Bari, with his attribute the Judoc Josse. Christer Westerdahl, Hermit, originally from Brit- tany, died Patron saint of people connected with shipping, and merchants especially English. Unusual in the North but represented e. Apostle, missionary, together with St. Simon a patron saint in England for ship builders and their guilds. Julian us. The ship as an emblem, patron saint of ferry- men, travellers, sometimes crusaders, but even of sailors and galley slaves.
Less likely in the North. Nicholas of Myra and Bari. Fourth century AD, Asia Minor. The ship and the anchor as emblem, often with the bishop himself as a full-length figure with his crosier. Olav and his brother Harald, who was much less a saintly character, a popular theme in medieval folklore. Chapter 6. Christer Westerdahl, is of course better known as S: Often the saint of maritime cities where the principal church is devoted to him and the town seal may depict him.
In the North he was only second in popu- larity to St. His name is found as nikulas, nigulas on rune stones, early 12th century Sweden: U, U The two baptismal fonts with the first depiction of the stern rudder are devoted to his legend, made in the same species of sandstone from present-day Belgium c.
Very unlikely to be of interest in the North, at least after the severance of contacts with the East by the Mongols in c. The foremost Nordic patron saint for seafarers and merchants. Probably considerably more churches devoted to him in Sweden and Finland than even in Norway itself. Ursula and the 11, virgins being slaughtered in a ship in the Rhine at Cologne.
Christer Westerdahl, an altar or a chapel devoted to him. Olav is, like S: He is a very likely — and well-recorded — choice by fishing and sail- ing men in the North. As we shall see he is partic- ularly popular in harbour chapels of Gotland and Norrland, Sweden. A string of place names connects his cult with maritime sites along the Norrland coast fig. In several cases these sites are supposed in legends to have been visited by him in person. The same applies to the terrestrial sites.
Paul us. The Apostle Saul from Tarsus in Asia Minor, disciple of Jesus, is associated with ships because of his extensive missionary travels and in particular his mirac- ulous rescue from a storm at Malta. Peter Petrus. The Apostle.
Like S: Peter is associated with ships, although he was not miraculously rescued. Symbolized by a fish. Perhaps a more likely choice for a church in an urban environment.
Peter the Martyr. Invoked in stormy weather. Erasmus above, sometimes associated with the St. Elmo fires as well. Phocas of Sinope at the Black Sea. A slightly mythical figure. The patron saint of sailors, in particular in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. His name is identical to the Greek word for a seal the animal , which has given associations with the maritime world in general.
Apostle, missionary, suffered martyrdom together with St. Thomas of Canterbury and the apostle St. Thomas the saint, St. Thomas Beckett, is often depicted sitting in a ship.
The first depictions still show a ship with a side-rudder, see above on St. He could at this time be invoked at ship yards. Thomas, doubting Thomas, who was supposed to have travelled to India as a missionary. A rune stone of c. Ursula and the 11, Virgins. The princess Ursula tried to avoid being married to a pagan Hunnish king. According to an obscure legend her martyrdom and that of her followers took place on board a fleet in the harbour of Cologne and was perpetrated by Huns.
Virgins martyred there are mentioned in an inscription from c. AD — in Cologne. This story is well known in all Nordic medieval calendaries. She is associated with some maritime myths, e. Sunniva of Selje, Western Norway, which will have a particular place in this text below.
Vincent de Paul. The ship as emblem. A patron saint of sailors and galley slaves. Probably unlikely in the North. Died in AD The arch-martyr of Spain, the patron saint of Portugal.
For sailors etc. The fish as an attribute was used in connection with Sts. Botvid, Brendan, Maclovius St. Of course there are several others, e. San Zeno of Verona, but they are presumably too remote in this context. Here is a short description of the three saints hitherto unmentioned in this text: He went to England and returned as a Christian missionary.
His relics were later transferred to the church of Botkyrka Botvidskyrka where a large stone church was built in His attributes were an axe and a fish fig. He ought to have been a suitable patrocinium for a fishing chapel on the east coast of Sweden, Curi- ously enough there is no such known, but a possibility will be discussed below. Botvid, with a fish and an axe.
Botvid was, however, a layman. This is far from the core area of St. Botvid iconogra- phy in the east, if it is correctly interpreted, and may in this case have carried a particular significance at this church site.
Trotzig Malo or St. He was born c. AD in Wales but later went to Brit- tany. According to legends he was a seafarer and follower of St. His relics were later robbed and kept in the town of S: She was a pious countess, daughter of the Hungarian king.
There are many other maritime saints, however not of much current interest for devo- tion in the Catholic North. Among these are the saints of the Rhine, Sts. Werenfrith, Mater- nus, Lubentius and Arnul. According to legends they were miraculously transported after death on the river against the current but without any propulsion.
On the peninsula Teelin in Ireland Mary and three saintly women, etc. On the other hand, according to Alain Cabantous, it can be shown that in recent times the local saints and saints without any specific maritime connection, were important in Catholic fishing milieux of France and Flanders. But in the medieval Catholic North there were uncommonly few local saints. Besides, we are concentrating our attention here on the small archipelago chapels to which there is almost no counterpart in France.
Their patron saints are connected to the parish churches. Barbara, St. Bartolomew, St. Botolf, St. Birgitta St. Bridget of Vadstena , St. Gertrud, St. Canute St. Knut , St. Clara, St. Elof St. Elav , St. John the Baptist, St. Lawrence, St. Margaret, St. Otto, St. Sigfrid and St. In the following remarks I digress slightly in order to discuss these saints: She is one of the main helpers, and the protector of the dying.
She is associated in a rather far-fetched way with a large number of crafts. One of the three holy virgins, together with St. Margaret and St. Catherine of Alexandria. One of the Apostles, a great missionary traveller, according to legend he was martyred in Armenia by being skinned alive. Patron of several crafts, he is often, strangely enough, associated with leather crafts.
His day is associated with fishing chapels in Norrland, Sweden. See note Birgitta, St. Bridget of Vadstena — Birgitta is the foremost patron saint of Sweden and in fact also of Europe , and founder of the Birgittine monastic order, which has a great following in the North.
She is memorialized by two chapels in the list of In fact it seems obvious that she superseded her namesake, St.
Brigida Bridget of Kildare, Ireland, at least in some places. Botulf or St. Botolph was a foremost Anglo-Saxon abbot saint, who died in AD , and was quite popular in England. In the North he is mainly found in eccle- siastical contexts in Denmark. The name Botolf is already found on a Swedish rune stone N Markets on his day. Clara — Invoked in illness of a feverish kind and associated with some crafts.
Nowadays she is also considered the saint of television! Elof Elav. No details of him are known. John the Baptist, Johannes Baptista. A predecessor and baptist of Jesus himself, one of the patrons of Sweden and Finland. Often represented by his head on a dish, since he was decapitated by king Herodes Antipas, and by the Lamb with the Banner of Victory, the arms of Gotland.
The early wall paintings of the royal Danish parish church of Jelling, Jutland, dated c. Knut or St. Canute, Danish king killed with his followers in the church of St.
Alban in Odense, Denmark on 13th January, , which is his day. In about he was replaced by the other Knut for the guilds below. Kings belonging to his powerful family sped his elevation. Some are found in Sweden as well 7 , presumably mostly serving Danish merchant needs.
A very popular saint, and available for many purposes, of which none has anything particularly to do with the sea. From Antiokia in Pisidia, Asia Minor.
Martyred under the emperor Diocletian in AD She helped in childbirth, was a protector of farmers etc. One of the holy virgins, together with St.
Barbara above and St. At the turn of the century he was supposed to have been the hird bishop of King Olav Tryggvason of Norway, but later went to Sweden. Kalmar, SE Sweden appendix. Stephen, the Protomartyr. The first Christian martyr was stoned to death early in the first Christian century by a Jewish mob led by Saul, later St.
This legend, in which several previous accounts come together, tells that a slaughtered cock was miraculously brought to life crow- ing Christus natus est. In popular dramas and ballads he was either one of the shepherds at Bethlehem or a groom and protector of horses, with which he Staffan is particularly associated. If this story is true he was one of the earliest true Scandinavian martyrs. Even in late Protestant times, during the late 18th century, his grave, Hille Bror Staffans stupa, was venerated and a stone house, still standing, was built on the spot.
Finally, an important pilgrimage spring existed in Denmark with a chapel devoted to an obscure Helena Lene , possibly a version of the local saint, St. A woman saint, of whom we will hear more later, St. Thora, with a consort and brother, St. The chapel of St. The views of the Catholic Church, especially in the British Isles have been admirably summarized by the maritime archaeologist Joe Flatman and I quote him: