Sobre esta base es posible ver el proyecto crítico de Foucault como un contrapunto crítico de la obra de Habermas. Específicamente, se plantea que la teoría de. any disagreement that the Habermas-Foucault debate – if there ever was David Owen, “Orientation and Enlightenment,” in Foucault contra Habermas, eds. normativity; power; recognition. Much ink has been spilled on the relation of Michel Foucault to Jürgen Habermas, under the heading of the “Foucault- Habermas.
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Request PDF on ResearchGate | On Jan 1, , Day Wong and others published Foucault Contra Habermas. Request PDF on ResearchGate | On Mar 1, , Day Wong and others published Foucault contra Habermas: Knowledge and power. title: Foucault Contra Habermas: Recasting the Dialogue. author: Ashenden, Samantha.; Owen, David. Habermas and the Politics of Critique Samantha Ashenden and David Owen The encounter between the practices of critical reflection elaborated by Michel Foucault and by Jürgen.
The contributors also discuss the ethics of dialogue; the practice of criticism, the politics of recognition; and the function of civil society and democracy. He consequently knows that Foucault. He detects in Foucault's thought a residual moralism revolving around the twin humanist foci of human freedom and creativity. Habermas in fact responds to an invitation extended by Foucault himself. He thus allows his critique of genealogy to devolve into a personal indictment of Foucault. From its inception. It is to say that we should treat the Enlightenment not as an event to the substance of which we need to be faithful but as evidence of a spirit that we might want to rekindle.
Kelly ed. Political Theory Newsletter. Cambridge University Press. Economy and Society. Polity pp. Critique and Power: New York: Random House. Tully ed. Polity Honneth. Political Theory. Beacon Press.
Weber Nicholson. Lenhardt and S. Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics. Paul Rabinow. Here it is shown that whereas Foucault acknowledges but dissents from the claims of critique. In taking this approach. The second is to illustrate the stakes of the debate by showing that this encounter poses important questions concerning the ethics of dialogue.
The first and second sections focus on the grammars of critique and genealogy respectively by drawing out the distinct modes of orienting thinking exhibited by these practices of critical reflection. The third section explores this encounter by focusing on an asymmetry which characterises Habermas' and Foucault's relations to each other's practices. The first is simply to try and clarify the terms of the debate by elucidating critique and genealogy as distinct practices of critical reflection.
The argument will be presented in four sections. In the opening section. The second section demonstrates that genealogy exemplifies an orientation in thinking in which thinking is oriented to an immanent ideal and that it articulates this orientation in terms of the process of becoming otherwise than we are through the agonic use of reason.
Habermas fails to acknowledge the claims of genealogy and that this avoidance of genealogy is a necessary feature of Habermas' own practice. Ludwig Wittgenstein This chapter addresses the dialogue between critique and genealogy by drawing attention to these practices of critical reflection as ways of orienting thinking. Reason depends on this freedom [of discussion] for its very existence.
I will illustrate this claim by reference to Kant's reflections on critique and enlightenment before showing that Habermas' post-metaphysical reconstruction of Kantian critique demonstrates his commitment to the same mode of orientation in thinking.
In the preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason  Kant proclaims: Our age is. From its inception. In both cases we will see that this way of orienting thinking produces a specific conception of enlightenment and.
Kant's philosophy links criticism to the unconstrained public use of reason. B f. But they then awaken just suspicion. Kant proposes the following maxims as transcendental hypotheses: Religion through its sanctity and law-giving through its majesty may seek to exempt themselves from it.
For reason has no dictatorial authority. I The central claim of this section is that the grammar of critique can be presented schematically as follows: Kant argues that the free public use of reason is a necessary condition for the development of public enlightenment. From these maxims we can deduce the transcendental formula of moral law: In these essays.
These points are related but. Kant elaborates this threat in the following terms: For Kant. What conclusions can we draw from Kant's reflections on enlightenment and the lawless use of reason? The pertinent conclusion for my argument here is simply this: Kant's remarks are only intelligible given an understanding of enlightenment as the project of striving to reconcile the real and the ideal through the lawful use of reason.
Kant's understanding of critique as the articulation of the transcendental presuppositions of the test of free and open discussion. Kant argues. We should note initially that Habermas shares Kant's emphasis on the relationship between criticism and communicative freedom. There are two initial points to note about this threat.
Kant identifies it as a threat to enlightenment simply by virtue of the fact that it undermines the authority of the moral law. To elucidate Habermas' particular account of critique as a way of orienting thinking. Habermas specifies rationality in relation to these three types of validity claim: The fact that a speaker can rationally motivate a hearer to accept such an offer is not due to the validity of what he says but to the speaker's guarantee that he will.
Drawing on speech act theory. From these rules of rational argumentation. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.
On the basis of U. Habermas deduces the transcendental formula of discourse ethics D: Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
Habermas distinguishes three levels of presupposition: Habermas deduces the universalisation principle U: Procedural rules Habermas tentatively specifies these rules as follows: Logical-semantic rules Processual rules Habermas conceptualises this obstruction in terms of the system's colonisation of the lifeworld and the impoverishment of culture.
Cultural impoverishment undermines the synthesising and thus critical power of everyday consciousness. Both of these aspects of the reification of social life entail the progressive detachment of individuals from the coordination of action orientations through communicatively achieved consensus and. The effect of this is to fragment everyday consciousness. More specifically. Habermas specifies communicative freedom as a necessary condition of public enlightenment.
Habermas does not regard this right as a sufficient condition for public enlightenment. The costs of this colonisation can be expressed as that of the commodification and the juridification of the lifeworld.
We can begin by noting that just as Kant argues that his age has the potential to become enlightened but that the development of enlightenment is blocked by the guardians of humanity.
On the other hand. Given these threats to enlightenment. The implications of this analysis for the concept of enlightenment are drawn out in Habermas' philosophical reflections on.
This colonisation is organised in the private sphere via the roles of employee and consumer through which individuals are subjected to the functional imperatives of the economic subsystem and in the public sphere via the roles of client and citizen in which individuals are subjected to the functional imperatives of the state-administrative subsystem. For example. In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity b. As with Kant.
Habermas argues that Foucault presents a critique of reason through a totalising theory of power the other of reason but that the cost of this radical critique is demonstrated in the fact that Genealogy is overtaken by a fate similar to that which Foucault had seen in the human sciences: To the extent that it retreats into the reflectionless objectivity of a non-participatory. In just this respect. On Habermas' account. For Habermas.
I will focus on the lawless use of reason. Habermas argues. The defining feature of this lawlessness is that Foucault's genealogical practice cannot account for the normative foundations of its own rhetoric: Habermas identifies a third threat to enlightenment.
Foucault's genealogy collapses back into what Habermas describes as a Nietzschean aestheticism i. We may conclude by noting that. Habermas' concern here is that genealogy as a practice. But at the same time it also results in releasing the cognitive potentials accumulated in the process from their esoteric high forms and attempting to apply them in the sphere of praxis.
Habermas manifests the same double-sided attitude to practices of critical reflections that exhibit the lawless use of reason. This section has been concerned to elucidate the character of critique as a particular practice of critical reflection.
We can summarise Habermas' specific way of orienting thinking thus: Habermas' reflections are only intelligible given an understanding of enlightenment as the project of striving to reconcile the real and the ideal through the lawful use of reason.
This fact is disclosed. Again the lawless use of reason exploits the freedom to make public use of one's reason and undermines the authority of the moral law. As Hindess has acutely noted. Foucault makes the following remarks: I think that the Enlightenment as a set of political. I also think that as an enterprise for linking the progress of truth and the history of liberty in a bond of direct relation.
I think. II The general claim to be advanced now is this: It is appropriate to begin by simply illustrating the claim that genealogy resists the hegemony of critique's conception of enlightenment and that it does so by articulating a distinct conception of enlightenment.
This section will reverse the ordering of the previous section in order to draw out clearly both the difference between the conceptions of enlightenment which characterise critique and genealogy.
It even means that one has to refuse everything that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative: I want to emphasise the fact that the conception of enlightenment advocated by Habermas is generated by the orientation in thinking which critique legislates because.
Writing in response to Habermas' description of his work as anti-Enlightenment. This attitude. To illustrate the relationship of this conception of enlightenment as critical ethos to the Enlightenment.
Foucault argues: We must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are historically determined. These remarks sketch out Foucault's conception of enlightenment as a critical ethos and indicate the character of this ethos in terms of the process of becoming otherwise than we are through what we may call the agonic use of reason. Foucault provides a genealogical sketch of its emergence and development. Such an analysis implies a series of historical inquiries that are as precise as possible.
Rather than submit to this logic. Against the background of these reflections. Kant's essay links the critical attitude towards the limits to which we are subject in the present to a reflection on the present as singular. We have seen that Foucault proposes a conception of enlightenment as a critical ethos — an art of reflective indocility — which is expressed in contesting the limits to which we are subject through the agonic use of reason.
Foucault situates his own project as that of reversing this. It is this critical ethos of modernity which Foucault identifies as guiding his own practice. Foucault also argues that Kant's critical philosophy introduces a slippage which tipped enlightenment as a critical attitude in which we have the courage to question the limits to which we are subject into the question of critique as reason's transcendental judging of its own limits in which we submit to its law This slippage has typically resulted in the subordination of the expression of the critical attitude to the practice of critique as.
But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing. Archaeological — and not transcendental — in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge or all possible moral action. Let us turn now to showing how genealogy exemplifies this conception of enlightenment and to clarifying the immanent ideal to which this practice orients our thinking. Foucault sketches his understanding of the task of criticism in the following passage: Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting on limits.
These axes are interwoven in that it makes no sense to think of relations of ethics or of power without reference to some or other system of description and some or other form of reasoning directed to some or other ideal. We can begin by noting that Foucault. Practical systems are analysed in terms of three axes: To clarify the purpose and character of this practice of critical reflection.
What are the implications of this conceptual apparatus for reflecting on limits? Note that this apparatus conceptualises limits in terms of forms of subjectivity. Power is any relation that governs ethical subjects by guiding them. Foucault needs to show how we can experience a form of subjectivity or limit as problematic in such a way that the recognition of the non-necessary character of this limit is experienced as a form of liberation and motivates the experimental transgression of this limit.
Our mode of existence in any field of power and knowledge is clearly as practitioners of self-awareness and self-formation. In this sense. In elucidating this feature of Foucault's work. It is a subject of power. Paul Patton has pointed out that Foucault's genealogical investigations. On the contrary. Yet they were still in a state of domination insofar as these options were only ever stratagems that never succeeded in reversing the situation.
The analysis of power relations is an extremely complex area. Rather than speak of an essential freedom. Foucault's point is that. As practitioners of self-awareness and self-formation. When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations. Foucault's argument is that we have a general second-order interest in being able to exercise and. With respect to the latter. Genealogy is a practice of freedom. This latter point becomes clear when we note that genealogy as a self-directed exercise of our capacities for reflecting and acting on our ways of reflecting and acting on ourselves is itself a way of conducting our conduct directed to the development of our capacity for the self-directed exercise of our capacities for reflecting and acting on ourselves.
This judgement has authority only to the extent that it gains public assent. With respect to the former. This claim is reinforced if we consider the practice of genealogy not simply as an ethical labour that we perform on ourselves but also as an attempt to conduct the conduct of others. The judgement of practitioners of genealogy that this practice of critical reflection.
Thus genealogy exemplifies the conception of enlightenment as a critical ethos — precisely because genealogy is nothing other than the performance of an agonic engagement with a given limit or form of subjectivity which is experienced as problematic. We can draw this out both by reflecting on the claims of genealogy as a particular practice and also by considering the claims of any particular genealogical investigation.
We can begin by noting that Habermas' criticism fails to acknowledge the claims of genealogy precisely because it reflects on genealogy as a certain kind of thing the lawless use of reason rather than as a certain thing a singular practice of critical reflection. Rather than considering genealogy as this practice of critical reflection characterised by this mode of orientation in thinking. Habermas' reflections presuppose that genealogy can be justly addressed in terms of its capacity to satisfy the criteria of a post-metaphysical practice of critique.
In this section we have seen that genealogy articulates both a different relationship to orienting our thinking than critique — exemplification rather than legislation — and a distinct conception of enlightenment — the process of becoming otherwise than we are through the agonic use of reason rather than the project of reconciling the real and the ideal through the lawful use of reason. So it seems that even considered as an exercise of power.
So while both genealogy qua human beings as practitioners of criticism and any given genealogy qua human beings as citizens call for the assent of others and. III In this section I will try to redeem the promissory note offered in my introduction by showing that there is an asymmetry between Habermas' and Foucault's relations to each other's practices — that whereas Foucault acknowledges but dissents from the claims of critique.
Let us now reflect on the character of this criticism. We can summarise Foucault's position as follows: In the first section we noted Habermas' criticisms of Foucault as an advocate of the lawless use of reason. The irony of critique is thus that it advocates an understanding of reason in which reason is conceptualised as the test of free and open discussion.
The presupposition that the test of free and open discussion can be adequately captured in terms not merely of these rules.
This presumption is inbuilt into the Idea of Critique as reason's transcendental judging of its own limits. This point can be elucidated by simply noticing that it is a founding presumption of the practice of critique that it is the only practice of critical reflection which can legitimately orient thinking. Let us now turn to the claim that Foucault acknowledges but dissents from the claims of critique. This claim can be established by noting two features of Foucault's reflections on Habermas.
Perhaps the most notable indicator of the violence exhibited by this failure of acknowledgement is Habermas' presumption that Foucault is attempting to provide a general theory of power which reduces reason to expressions of power. But this conclusion would be too quick: Given these observations.
In this respect it is entirely consistent for Foucault to reject what Habermas claims for his claims concerning the present while having some sympathy for the content of these claims. While I. Thus Foucault. Foucault acknowledges the value of Habermas' work in remarks such as the following: I am quite interested in [Habermas'] work.
I have always had a problem insofar as he gives communicative relations this place which is so important and. We can account for this claim and link these two types of acknowledgement by noting that the fact that genealogy exemplifies a particular orientation in thinking entails that it is not committed to the claim that there is only one way of orienting thinking. This explains both why Foucault dissents from the claims of critique — he thinks that it mistakenly conceptualises being guided as a particular experience — and why he can acknowledge its critical claims as valuable: On principle.
They depend only on the dialogue situation. IV This final section addresses the implications of considering critique and genealogy in terms of orientation in thinking for the topic of the ethics of dialogue. Questions and answers depend on a game — a game that is at once pleasant and difficult — in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of the dialogue.
For him. As for the person answering the questions. In the serious play of questions and answers. The polemicist. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied. The person asking the questions is merely exercising the right that has been given to him: It is not my concern here to come down on one side or the other. Foucault considers three models of polemics — religious, juridical and political — and unsurprisingly it is the juridical model which most accurately characterises Habermas' practice: Yet this conclusion is too quick.
Habermas can offer a response. He can, for example, claim that a juridical polemic is compatible with dialogue if the participants alternately occupy the roles of the examiner-judge and the examinee-suspect — and here Habermas can reasonably point out that his commitment to communicative freedom entails recognising and defending Foucault's right of reply. This reply commits Habermas to two further claims concerning dialogue as a form of communicative action characterised by mutual recognition and respect.
First, that engaging in dialogue does not entail that a participant acknowledge the claims of the other in the terms in which they are presented; on the contrary, mutual recognition and respect are satisfied even if one redescribes these claims as a certain type of claim in terms of one's own system of description.
Secondly, that it is a legitimate dialogic move to illustrate that the claims of the other as a certain type of claim are not compatible with one's own commitments and to challenge the other to provide general reasons as to why one should surrender these commitments.
Another way of putting these three claims is simply to say that Habermas can resist the charge of performative contradiction by arguing that the constitutive features of dialogue can be reconstructed in terms of purely formal rules which guarantee reciprocal relations between participants, i. This move allows Habermas to resist the charge of performative contradiction because it entails that the attitude which one participant exhibits to another is irrelevant unless, and until, the mode of conduct which expresses this attitude breaches the formal rules of dialogic engagement.
Moreover, in just this respect, Habermas can also argue that his failure to acknowledge the claims of genealogy as just these claims is compatible with exhibiting mutual recognition and respect.
What conclusions can we draw from these reflections on Foucault's and Habermas' accounts of the ethics of dialogue? We can note that these reflections are consistent with the asymmetry which characterises their reflections on each other's work. Indeed, these reflections simply elucidate the implications of this asymmetry for thinking about mutual respect in so far as both Foucault and Habermas conceptualise dialogue as a practice of mutual respect.
Consequently, viewed under the aspect of dialogue, we can specify the stakes of the encounter between Habermas' practice of critique and Foucault's practice of genealogy as concerning how we reflect on mutual respect. On the one hand, for Foucault, mutual respect is understood as an attitude in which we acknowledge each other in thought and action as the self-governing beings that we are. This understanding accounts for, and is exhibited by, Foucault's concern with the topic of the care of the self and, in particular, the relationship between care of the self and the government of others addressed in his work on ancient and modern forms of government Foucault, , b, c, d.
On the other hand, for Habermas, mutual respect is reconstructed as a set of procedures through which we recognise each other in thought and action as members of the class of self-governing beings. This understanding of mutual respect accounts for, and is exhibited by, Habermas' concern with law and the form of the constitutional-democratic state Habermas, a.
In this regard, what is at stake in the encounter is the character of our ethical understanding of ourselves and of our relations to each other as self-governing beings, which is simply to say that what is at stake is the very concept of enlightenment. Conclusion The purpose of this chapter has not been to evaluate or adjudicate between critique and genealogy as practices of critical reflection. Rather it has been concerned to illustrate the value of reflecting on these practices as ways of orienting thinking for elucidating significant differences between them and to clarify the stakes of this encounter.
But no doubt it is apparent that the chapter also has two further purposes. The first is simply to reinforce the claim that it is still worthwhile to explore the encounter between these practices, to claim both that the contest between critique and genealogy has yet to be decided, and that investigating this contest yields insights into what is at stake in our ways of reflecting on our historical being in the present.
The second is to draw attention to a contrast between two modes of moral education: This is my underlying theme and it is a topic that requires and deserves further reflection. I am grateful to the conference organiser, Maurizio Passerin D'Entreves, for inviting me and to those present for their comments. References Foucault, M. Foucault, M. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Rabinow ed. Kritzman ed. Politics, Philosophy, Culture. Schmidt ed. University of California Press. Ethics, Harmondsworth: Habermas, J.
Polity Press. Deflem ed. Benhabib and M. Hindness, B. Vincent ed. Tradition and Diversity. Hutchings, K. Kant, I. Clarendon Press. Reiss ed. MacCarthy, T. Hoy and T. MacCarthy, Critical Theory. Patton, P.
Tully, J. Becker ed. St James Press. White, S. Where did this new race come from? What produced it? What made it so effective? What perpetuates it? For the same men are still with us. For thinkers like Habermas as well as a host of lesser aspirants. Given his theoretical position.
I can palpate it as if through a foreign body that prevents me from grasping it or even seeing it. Foucault's work is self-defeating because. Independently of all that can be explained about the French Revolution. I can sense the presence of this unknown object.
It is a virus of a new and unknown kind. I am exhausting my mind trying to conceive a clear notion of this object and seeking a way to depict it properly. There have been violent Revolutions in the world before. The Use of Pleasure Foucault. This elaboration of one's own life as a personal work of art.
Foucault must tell us what his norms are. Putting things more crudely than we should. It appears. Aesthetic Morality The idea of an aesthetics of existence might seem to relate to politics initially only in a rather distant sense.
One very general thing — a principle of invention. This is the idea of what Foucault calls aesthetics of existence. He must specify what he wants. But Foucault cannot speak in the name of the oppressed because he believes in the ubiquity of power.
Let us. Foucault presumably regards this as being a question of aesthetics in so far as what is at stake is an autonomisation of life according to a certain creative style. Bernauer and Mahon. Only certain ascetic practices were more closely linked to the exercise of a personal liberty. Foucault feels it has some contemporary pertinence in that we have again reached a stage in history — without overriding moral norms or decisive systems of knowledge — in which the elaboration of an aesthetics of existence might once again be apposite.
Aesthetic morality should be its own yardstick. Why should a painter work if he is not transformed by his own painting? To this absence of a morality. The aesthetics of existence is. The Nietzschean idea is given by Foucault's emphasis on aesthetics of existence not just as an end in itself but as a process of self- transformation: Foucault says of his own work on this point: This transformation of oneself by one's own knowledge is. In short.
So unlike the modern era where. Its aesthetic character is given by its opposition to the concept. Perhaps this idea of an aesthetics of existence would not be particularly interesting if it only related to the ancient Greeks.
Foucault is unhappy with the idea of a moral code but his aesthetics is clearly a question of a morality — a kind of doctrineless. The Kantian idea is that a work of art is something that exists in and of itself which has value precisely in so far as it has no other externally determined value.
Such an aesthetic model of existence is not meant to be based on a scientific knowledge of the self. These elements can presumably be quite open-ended. It is not an injunction to live what would be commonly seen as an artistic life. Foucault elaborates on this theme. What is sure is that the idea of an aesthetic morality is most certainly not an injunction to become aestheticist in a narrow sense.
But in fact. Once again there is a Nietzschean echo. Art is not to be compensation for life. It is a question not of devoting one's life to art — be that painting. We never find out what he actually wants. Foucault's indeterminacy on this point is quite in keeping with the notion of an aesthetics of existence itself. Foucault is thinking here of the techne ton biou of classical antiquity.
Perhaps there is something of a historical tale to be told here. Noel Coward or today's new laddish avant-garde artists. It is not — or not necessarily — a question of withdrawing into the self and of retreating from the world but a question of the stylisation of all of the elements of one's life.
It is the model of the artist who. Foucault used to get on people's nerves by refusing to state what kinds of aesthetics of existence he is talking about. They are rather the product of an ongoing experiment or process of trial and error. For one cannot specify the nature of aesthetics of existence in advance. What is at stake is an aestheticisation of life. Dover introduces a very important theme which retrospectively illuminates his entire analysis. Neither a civil law. But for Seneca. What interested Foucault about such movements was the way that they stylised a mode of existence for themselves outside of existing norms.
Foucault's Politics There is an obvious and not so interesting way and a slightly less obvious. One option would be what could be labelled the subcultural sociology of aesthetics of existence. And if sexual ethics were indeed rigorous. Foucault writes that in the last pages of his book. That is roughly what we pursue in what follows. For instance. Amongst the Greeks … the regulation of sexual comportment did not take the form of a code. Although Foucault does not espouse anything so terrifying as the sort of aesthetic politics that so worried Walter Benjamin.
Foucault invokes the idea of a progressive politics that would be less a question of a doctrine than of a certain ethos. In that sense. It would be mistaken to think of this as being akin to a postmodern celebration of permanent difference and change.
Foucault's meaning is almost certainly more serious: One might gloss this. In his pieces on the meaning of enlightenment. What one is has now become a question one poses.
An enlightened politics on this count would. One of Foucault's targets here is that of doctrinal fidelity to the ideal of the revolution. The spirit of enlightenment is not provided.
In some senses. A few years before he had written these words about enlightenment and revolution. Foucault's — unjustifiably maligned — journalistic writings on Iran. Foucault constantly refers to the anti-Shah demonstrations as moments of pure collective subjectivity and refusal.
The point about Foucault's discussion of Kant here is not least that we should take a similar attitude to the Enlightenment ideal itself. It is emblematic. The revolt was. It is to say that we should treat the Enlightenment not as an event to the substance of which we need to be faithful but as evidence of a spirit that we might want to rekindle. This interest was motivated by Foucault's conviction that political activity is as much the feature of situated political events and conducts as it is of ideologies and intellectual theorisations.
But in an interview on Iran. When the mosques were too full for the crowds. But such refusal. Foucault appears to defend the idea of the apparently pointless demonstration for its own sake. The demonstration. Foucault b: Or they can even be meaningless. The irrationality of the revolt might be said to be. What interested him about Iran.
Of course revolts can go wrong. But what sort of a solidarity is this? For Foucault. But Foucault's conception of right is based not on our status as human beings but on our status as governed beings. This is not really moral solidarity but an ethical or perhaps. Hence Foucault's particular interest in the emergence of new means for expressing such solidarity.
Foucault's writings on Iran do not exhibit anything so shocking as an aesthetic politics as such. Muslim religion is not a moral code. Foucault suggests. After all. Given that we are all subject to government.
It is more than that: What fascinates Foucault about the revolt is the fact that it is irreducible to theoretical constructions. Nor is Muslim religion reducible to an ideological force. This may seem a strange idea for such an infamously anti- humanist thinker to embrace. But the institutional sphere of politics. Here we have. The purpose of political protest is not one of empty affirmation. Anyone can speak up for anyone else in so far as they share the fact that they are governed. European solidarity dictated that the situation in Poland was important and the business of everybody Foucault.
It is certainly of note that the philosopher who is famous for supposedly arguing that intellectuals have no right to speak for the oppressed or for particular social groups is here espousing a view concerning the ubiquity of the right to speak. What was important for him. Amnesty International. His model here was.
But it is not just a question of protest. In this context. Some Implications Transformation. Humans are not meaningfully born with rights. Reading Foucault's contributions to philosophical journalism. Such an attitude represents. Reading the huge literature of commentary that has been devoted to Foucault.
It is as well. Foucault's own scholarly works may themselves be considered to be exercises in a certain kind of historical politics of truth.
The fact that only limited things about Foucault's politics can be said is itself interesting. Foucault would certainly counsel caution in such matters. His is a political morality that emphasises creativity and singularity.
To be sure. While we wait for such principles. It is rather as if Foucault suspects that little can come by way of politics from asserting universal principles such as ideal speech situations. Rather what is constantly emphasised is the difficulty of governing. Such characterisations are patently absurd. Which is not. This is nothing so grandiose as a critique of theory- building enterprises.
Foucault's political ethos was certainly not anti-intellectual. And why should it? One can hold to the idea of a plurality of critical discourses without succumbing to the postmodern shibboleths of a plurality of realities or truths. But there is a kind of humanism at stake here in that Foucault clearly regards it as an aspect of human capabilities to be affected and to undergo transformation and reorientation in the manner envisaged by an aesthetic education.
Habermas is not wrong to do so. Habermas or what could be worse? Foucault himself. In any case. So what of Habermas? In this chapter. Habermas speaks in the language of propositions and science. Perhaps we should trust to our practices rather than our ideas. But this is a middle-distance not a long-distance rejection. As for the question of an aesthetic politics of criticism in this connection.
Perhaps Foucault's own critical problematic is. He did not bark because there was no dog. None of this. Perhaps part of the problem has always been that commentators have tended to make assumptions about the style of criticism that animated Foucault's oeuvre. Things are far from complacently in order in Foucault's world. It is not a celebration of the end of ideology. Habermas would like to prove that justice is truth. It is not as if one could ever say that Foucault would have disagreed with this or that political conviction of Habermas.
Habermas — not entirely unlike Foucault — is also interested in grounding a form of morality that would still owe something to Kant. For why is it really necessary to ground justice? Why is justice so worthless. Habermas wants to know what are the conditions of moral subjectivity. The task of criticism is to make way for justice. Assessment of the relative merits of these thinkers — which is already to put the matter wrongly — must really stand or fall on an assessment of their projects at this level of a critical ethos.
But even then it would not. Foucault's thought is. At most it might lead to a certain scepticism about some of the aspirations of both thinkers — especially Habermas. We strive for justice because we find things intolerable: In some ways they are interestingly dissimilar. Is it taking liberties to suggest that Foucault would find such a notion unnecessary at best. But all this is a difference in critical style.
It is only that whereas Foucault wanted — in the particular manner that he had distilled from Kant's essays — to act on the present. The Cambridge Companion to Foucault.
These volumes. I am indebted to Colin Gordon and David Owen for their comments on a previous version of the current chapter. References Bernauer. All quotations from this work in this chapter are my translations. Gutting ed. Semiotext e. New Formations. The Foucault Reader. UCL Press. What Is Enlightenment? Michel Foucault: Social theory and the ethics of truth. History of the Present.
Michel Foucault. Routinely and roundly dismissed for its supposedly uncharitable interpretation of Foucault's books. PDM is often adduced by Foucault's champions as conclusive evidence of Habermas' unwillingness to engage in serious philosophical discussion with Foucault. Habermas' treatment of Foucault in fact constitutes prima facie evidence.
The thought that there could be a state of communication which would be such that the games of truth could circulate freely. Conway I met Foucault only in I can only relate what impressed me: I know that he does not agree with what I say — I am a little more in agreement with him — but there is always something which causes me a problem.
At the level of genealogical communication. For this reason. In order to do so. Provoked by Foucault's avowed opposition to the traditions of humanism. I interpret Habermas' angry chapters on Foucault as constituting a response to an invitation issued by Foucault himself. Foucault receives a relatively extended hearing. Habermas is able to make his case. Habermas situates Foucault in the privileged lineage of post-Nietzschean philosophy.
Habermas is more or less successful. In his execution of this task.
Foucault instead descends from Nietzsche via Bataille. Habermas also insists. That is. Toward this end. Habermas openly applauds the self-corrective exercises that govern the internal development of Foucault's thinking. Habermas devotes two full chapters of PDM to his account of the development — and eventual shipwreck — of Foucault's thinking. To separate or police these dancers. Foucault began his career as a kindred thinker and aspiring conservator of the counterdiscourse of modernity.
Foucault cannot help but appeal. In his basic concept of power. According to Habermas. This account of the development of Foucault's thinking establishes the dramatic form of Habermas' riposte. According to the terms of this motif. Rather than provide an alternative to subject-centred reason. Foucauldian genealogy accomplishes at best a cosmetic reversal of traditional ontological categories. Foucault has forced together the idealist idea of transcendental synthesis with the presuppositions of an empiricist ontology.
In attempting to defend the normative claims he wishes to derive from his genealogical investigations. Here power relationships are of interest as conditions for the rise of scientific knowledge and as its social effects. Part II. Here the interest is in power relationships as constitutive conditions for scientific knowledge.
Foucauldian genealogy. This approach cannot lead to a way out of the philosophy of the subject. Foucauldian genealogy unwittingly reinscribes the primacy and privilege of the ontological subject: Foucault's genealogy of the human sciences enters on the scene in an irritating double role. Foucault strays from the path marked out by their common opposition to the hegemony of subject-centred reason.
Habermas insists. On Habermas' reconstruction. Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway. WorldCat is the world's largest library catalog, helping you find library materials online.
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SAGE, Print book: English View all editions and formats Summary: Many of the most difficult arguments in the exchange - understanding the history of the present; the function of normative criticism; the relation between relativism and universalism - are subject to critical analysis. The contributors also discuss the ethics of dialogue; the practice of criticism, the politics of recognition; and the function of civil society and democracy.
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