Pakistan a Modern History by Ian Talbot - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read book online. pdf. Review: 'PAKISTAN: A NEW HISTORY'. By Ian Talbot (London, ) the book under review presents the history of Pakistan of the last six decades. In Pakistan: A New History, Ian Talbot presents a comprehensive text which in chronological order, addressing their trials and tribulations in depth. Talbot.
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This book fills the need for a broad, historically sophisticated understanding of Pakistan, a country at fifty which is understood by many in the West only in terms . Pakistan: a new history, by Ian Talbot, London, C. Hurst, , xv + pp. In Pakistan: A new history, Talbot paints an intricate picture of the evolution of the. caite.info - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf ) or view presentation slides online.
Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The growing disorder which undermined Benazir Bhuttos second government in the summer of was directly rooted in the swingeing tax increases of Rs. Pakistani politics are ephemeral, displaying a bewildering array of shifting allegiances and alliances. Shackle, 'Saraiki: The crisis which coincided with the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's second government was narrowly averted byrecourse to short term high interest. The psychological reactions arising from the frustratIOns of newly-ennched returnees who perhaps unsuccessfully demand an increase?
It also covers "Zia's" Islamisation of Pakistan. The last part highlights the political struggle of power between Nawaz Sharif and Shaheed Benazir Bhutt This book is divided into 4 parts.
The last part highlights the political struggle of power between Nawaz Sharif and Shaheed Benazir Bhutto. Ian Talbot's book is a complete, dense and a well-researched analysis of Pakistan. There is uneven distribution of resources at the time of birth, a bloody migration, withheld resources, identity confusion, military coups, constitution suspensions, unfulfilled promises, assassinations, involvements of puppeteers, the attractive geopolitical vantage points, radicalization, economic challenges, social challenges, and environmental challenges etc.
Pakistan's past is bleak but there is hope of converting the "failed promise" of to something fruitful according to the historian. Nov 28, Sania Sufi rated it it was amazing. View 1 comment. Jun 29, Mitul Choksi rated it really liked it Recommends it for: Researchers on Pakistan. This book is a very well written book.
It goes into tremendous detail regarding the Pakistan movement in British India and also the birth and rise of Pakistan as a modern nation state. The only drawback of this book is that it uses a lot of abbreviations.
Except that, this book is a good one. Jun 27, Chatgemini rated it really liked it. For an Indian, this book fulfills to a large extent the void that exists about adequate information about the growth of Pakistan as a nation. It is a bit outdated as it ends its narrative in - 20 years since a lot happened but it does a good job of pointing out the critical shortcomings that have plagued that country since whilst offering suggestions to improve the situation though very simplistic at times.
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Readers Also Enjoyed. Christopher Clapham along with other theorists of'the third-world state hus maintained that its hallmark is the combination of both power and fragility. Institutionalist explanations for Pakistani authoritarianism are similarly set within the wider comparative politics context of Samuel Huntington's understanding of order and stability in post-colonial states. According to this model, poverty, regional, linguistic and religious group conflicts do not of themselves create instability.
It only occurs when institutions are too weak to cope with the conflict over scarce resources which results from increased social and political mobilisation. In this situation, newly emergent groups are not socialised into the system, nor are their demands absorbed.
Instead they enter it on their own terms and 'civic politics' are replaced by disorder which in turn results in praetorianism. This model of analysis has been deployed by a number of scholars to explain military intervention in Pakistan.
Sayeed in more colourful language adopts a similar analysis:. Pakistan during was very much like Hobbes' state of nature where every political or provincial group fought against every other group. And martial law was the Leviathan which emerged to maintain law and order and public good at the point of the sword. Veena Kukreja has similarly understood this period as one of general decay in political institutionalisation resulting in a crisis of legitimacy.
She declares that 'in sum, Pakistan seems to aptly fit Huntington's model of praetorian society where military interventions are only specific manifestations of the broader phenomenon of underdevelopment and general politicisation of social forces and institutions.
Y Maleeha Lodhi analyses the army's intervention in the same terms of the institutional weakness of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party PPP which lost its effectiveness as an instrument of political participation and recruitment when it substituted the co-option of local influentials for organisational development.
Unaware of the simmerinS discontent, Bhutto miscalculated in calling the iII-fated elections. See K. The Death It a State Harmondsworth, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India New Delhi, , p. This reached its logical absurdity in August when out of forty-three members of the Balochistan Provincial Assembly, no less than thirty-one held official positions in the government of Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Magsi. Common to much political science writing on Pakistan however is a lack of historical and behavioural empirical data.
David Gilmartin's and Theodore Wright's pioneering work notwithstanding," the role of the biraderi kinship group in political mobilisation for example has received nothing like the attention of caste in the Indian context. Biraderi rivalries were particularly important in the 'partyless' February and April elections.
At the time of the latter the influential Urdu daily paper Nawa-i-Waqt Voice of the Times lamented that it was 'regrettable so many election campaigns are being waged on the basis of sectarian and regional loyalties', and Zamindar asked the electorate, 'not to vote for persons who appeal only in the name of castes and factions'. Earlier 'high politics' accounts of the British transfer of power similarly disembodied political developments from their social realities.
The growing use of literary sources to uncover the human dimension of. Gilmartin, 'Biraderi and Bureaucracy: I JanuaryJune , pp. Kothari ed. Rehman, 'A Question of Culture? A starting point could be Shaukat Siddiqi's justly acclaimed novel Khuda Ki Basti" Its themes of corruption, political manipulation and I he degradation of the urban poor are the focus of much political science literature on Pakistan, but these take on a fresh starkness when given II human face through such characters as Niyaz, Khan Bahadur Farzand Ali, Nausha, Raja and Shami.
Similarly, theories of the geopolitical context, institutional decay uno the distance between state and society lack sufficient historical contextualisation to convincingly explain Pakistani authoritarianism. A historical understanding of the marginalisation of the Pakistan areas in the freedom movement is necessary to understand the concept of the state's autonomy from society, while the concept of a garrison state needs to be set in the context of colonial army recruitment policies lind the circumstances of the partition.
Ayesha Jalal43 has begun 10 examine the precise situations in which state building was emphasised over political participation, but a wider acknowledgement is required of the fact that Pakistan inherited from the Raj what has been termed II 'viceregal' tradition which strongly emphasised the supremacy of the executive over representative institutions.
Its strength in the future Pakistan regions resulted from the fact that British rule came late to Muslim north-west India and was prompted by strategic rather than commercial considerations.
Successive Pakistani regimes have suppressed popular participation by working within this tradition. Ayub Khan's Ilovernment for example issued a decree at the time of the promulgation of the Constitution which enabled the colonially derived authoriturian Frontier Crimes Regulation to be applied throughout West PakisIlIn.
The work has been published under the title of God's Own Land: A Novel of Pakistan, transl D. Matthews Sandgate, Moreover, the very nature of transitions requires?
They lack not only a sense of the historic role which ideas have played in political mobilisation, but a convincing understanding of the precise circumstances which trigger the transition from ethnic awareness to a politicisation of ethnic identity.
The division of labour between historians of the Pakistan region and political scientists has thus not served scholarship well. The abrupt termination of historical narratives in has helped obfuscate the continuities between the colonial and contemporary eras.
Although Pakistan emerged as a state with a new identity, its political culture and characteristics were profoundly influenced by historical inheritances from the colonial era. The importance of five such influences are stressed in this study. The first was the clash between regional identity and Muslim nationalism, which was barely hidden in both Sindh and Bengal during the Pakistan struggle.
The second was the problematic relationship between Islam and Muslim nationalism. Paradoxically, while Pakistan was created in the name of religion, many of the 'ulama opposed nationalism as un-Islamic, The third was the culture of political intolerance" forged in the Muslim League's desperate struggle against Congress and such powerful regional opponents as the Punjab Unionists.
The stakes were so high as the League clawed its way to power that all opposition was regarded as illegitimate. The Muslim League identified its own interests with those of the whole Indian Muslim community. These attitudes were carried over into the independence era, when Liaquat and other Muslim League leaders denounced political opposition as anti-state and even Indian-inspired.
The Muslim League responded to the Congress's hegemonic discourse by adopting an identity politics 'mobilised around the cultural markers and idioms of religion. Pakistan Perspective'. It has brought in its wake not only curbs on civil liberties and selective political accountability, but violence in the absence of a consensual and accommodationist political culture. This in turn has encouraged military intervention under the pretext of restoring law and order.
The fourth inheritance is the colonial state's practice of ruling indirectly through intermediaries such as landlords, tribal chiefs and princes.
The British tied them into their rule by elaborate networks of patronage and ensured that the tribal chiefs, landowners and Sufi pirs' predominance was unchallenged by agricultural commercialisation and the increasing introduction of representative institutions. Indeed many constituencies coincided with local patterns of power based on tribes, biraderis and landed estates. West Pakistan was thus to inherit a landlord's country in which little progress had been made in removing glaring social inequalities in the countryside.
Finally, Pakistan inherited historical traditions unique to each of the regions which were to comprise it. These have frequently been neglected in national level political studies, but have proved of immense importance in shaping post-colonial developments. In Sindh for example it is possible to discern in the s the beginnings of a 'national' consciousness reacting to the presence of 'outsider others'. These were Punjabi agriculturalists who were encouraged to migrate following the opening of the Sukkur barrage.
Sindhi sentiment against outsiders was submerged during the religious mobilisation of the freedom struggle, but re-emerged after independence in the wake of waves of mohajir, Pushtun, Punjabi and Baloch migrants. The nationalist leader G. Syed stated this resentment most baldly at the time of his eighty-eighth birthday celebrations, when he declared that all those who had entered Sindh after should he deprived of their civic and political rights and the influx of aliens he stopped.
In Balochistan, British rule froze the ethnic division of Baloch and Pushtun territory and prevented the gradual incorporation of the more. It also encouraged greater economic development in the northern Pushtun areas which were directly administered in British Balochistan than in the Baloch and Brahui areas of the Kalat States Union. The economic causes of the Baloch-Pushtun ethnic violence of the s were thus not just the result of the tensions generated by the Afghan War, but possessed deeper historical roots.
Similarly, both the Pushtunistan issue in the post-independence Frontier and the increasing alienation of Bengalis from the centre cannot be understood without recourse to their regional pre-independence histories. At the time of the abortive Cabinet Mission for example, the Pushtun leader Abdul Ghaffar Khan opposed compulsory grouping and maintained that 'we are happy in framing our own destiny by ourselves'.
Allah Nawaz Khan, Speaker of the Frontier Provincial Assembly articulated even more clearly the basis for a Pushtun identity when he declared in words reminiscent of the Lahore Resolution,. We are a nation of three million, and what is more, we, the Frontier Pathans, are a body of people with our own distinctive culture, civilisation, language, literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature and sense of values and proportion, legal and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, and aptitudes and ambitions.
In short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and by all canons of international law a Pathan is quite separate from a Punjabi. Anti-Punjabi sentiments are held quite widely by contemporary political leaders in the minority provinces. Some scholars have spoken in terms of the Punjabisation of Pakistan.
Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Pakhtuns: Crisis of National Identity' in G.
Singh and l. Talbot eds , Punjabi Identity: Continuity and Change New Delhi, , pp. II democratic dispensation. Punjab's political predominance was greatly increased with the breakaway of East Pakistan in But it can only be fully understood in terms of the colonial inheritance.
This laid the basis for its agricultural prosperity, industrial development and association with army recruitment. Following partition, the same Rajput tribes of the Pothwar plateau were recruited to the Pakistan Army.? The continuation of colonial policies of making land available to servicemen has created a nexus of interest between the landowners and military.
Many servicemen acquired redistributed land at knockdown prices after the land reforms. Punjabi domination of the Army has had immense political repercussions, for the Army has been the most important institution in the state and the self-appointed upholder of Pakistani stability and national identity.
Criticism of Punjab's role in Pakistani politics'" should not however be allowed to obscure the reality of cultural and economic differentiation within the province. Four distinct economic and cultural regions can be identified.
The northern region which corresponds to the administrative boundaries of the Rawalpindi division contains approximately 10 per cent of the province's population. From the colonial era onwards the inhabitants of this hilly region have supplemented low agricultural earnings with army recruitment and latterly with remittances from the Gulf.
The Punjabi-dominated army of journalistic and polemical rhetoric is in reality an army recruited largely from the Attock, Rawalpindi and. The clash between the two power centres had a considerable influence on the undermining of the Bhutto administration. Cohen, The Pakistan Army. Jhelum districts, although it is true that the economic multiplier effects of military recruitment ripple out to other areas of the province. The poorest region of the Punjab remains the western districts including Jhang district and the Sargodha and Dera Ghazi Khan divisions.
In contrast with central Punjab, its agrarian society and economy is organised on a feudal basis. Cultural differences overlay these socio-economic and climatic variations. To the north of the Salt Range, Hindko and Pothwari are spoken alongside Punjabi as regional languages, whereas in the south-western Punjab Siraiki, which is closely related to Sindhi, is spoken as a mothertongue by a considerable section of the population.
Kham, Rahimyar Khan and Bahawalpur. The dangers of an unrepresentative army increased during periods of marti al law and on the numerous occasions it was called on to restore order.
Bengali separatist sentiment during the s was undoubtedly fuelled both by the lack of Bengali representation in the military elite and by the discrimination towards the new East Bengal Regiment. The army he declared were 'seeking peasant boys rather than city boys'. Shackle, 'Saraiki: Karachi is the only other local political arena which is significant II lit ionally.
Successive waves of migration from India and within Pakistan huve resulted in over 5 per cent of the total population congregating In its urban sprawl, drawn by the hope of finding employment in its l'ukistan's only major port and retains its dominant commercial and Industrial position, accounting for approximately a quarter of Pakistan's manufacturing base and two thirds of the country's banking transactions.
This pivotal economic importance propelled the largely Karachi-based MQM to national political importance in the late s. The state's inability to maintain law and order in the city was an important factor III the dismissal of both the first Benazir Bhutto administration lind that of her successor Nawaz Sharif The charge sheet drawn up by President Farooq Leghari in November against Benazir Bhutto placed high on its list the prevalence of extra-judicial killings hy the police and the rangers during in the campaign to snuff out MQM militancy.
While Karachi could break national governments, it nevertheless lacked the Punjab's political preponderance.
Finally it is important to note the economic interconnection between Punjab and Karachi. All of the Punjab's foreign trade is transported through the latter region, the petroleum on which it depends also comes from the port and refineries of Karachi. Despite Punjab's dominance within the Pakistani economy liS a whole, Karachi plays a vital role in its functioning. It is clear even from this brief overview that historical and regional inheritances along with the legacy of the freedom struggle itself provide lin important insight into Pakistan's post-independence politics.
The state's contested national identity, uneven development, bureaucratic nuthoritarianism and imbalance between a weak civil society and dominant military can all be traced to the colonial era. In stating this argument however, it is important not to ignore earlier historical influences.
The British system of governance with its centralised administrative structure and the political co-option of local elites was based on Mughal practice. Resistance to obscurantist religious authority is associated not just with nineteenth-century Islamic modernism, but with the earlier writings of Varis Shah ?
Another Sufi, Shah Inayat of Jhok who distributed land to the downtrodden peasants of Sindh and was martyred in January reveals a long established tradition of social activism and resistance to state oppression.
The rebellion in Sindh ugainst Zia's regime was not only heir to this, but drew inspiration. The Punjabi PPP leader and Interior Minister in Benazir Bhutto's first administration, Aitzaz Ahsan'" has recently seized on such traditions to argue that the creation of Pakistan was not an historical aberration or the outcome of colonial divide and rule policies as Indian nationalist historiography has claimed; it was rather the culmination of a longestablished cultural and historical Indus tradition which has moulded the Pakistani personality as distinct from the Indian.
The attempt on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the British departure to establish a Pakistani identity rooted in the soil and history rather than in an 'obscurantist mould' was in itself interesting. The leading American analyst, Selig Harrison refutes such 'ingenuity' and understands Pakistan's post-independence political instability partly in terms of the 'artificiality' of the Pakistan state.
Religion alone has proved an insufficient means of building a nation out of disparate ethnic groups who had never previously coexisted except under colonialism. He points out that during the Mughal era, Punjab was an outlying province and the Pushtuns and Baloch were pitted against the authorities in Delhi.
Moreover, the Punjabis' contemporary ethnic assertiveness could be linked with their historical memory of rule by Afghan, Sikh and British outsiders. A striking change in the half century since independence seldom remarked upon is the establishment of a large Pakistani overseas community with a range of transnational linkages with the 'homeland'. The seat's holder is appointed by the Aznd Kashmir Prime Minister. Ellis and Z. Khan, 'Partition and Kashmir: Paper presented to 14th Europcnn conference on 'Modern South.
Better documented discontinuities include the accelerated postcolonial ethnicisation of Sindh' s politics as a result both of the preferential policies in the federal public employment sector from onwards lind the acceleration of Punjabi and Pushtun immigration in the Zia era. The task of nation building in Pakistan has been hampered not only by unresolved conflicts between regional, religious and nationalist identity inherited from the freedom movement, but by the attempts of successive martial law regimes to forcibly impose a national identity ruther than achieve it by consensus.
Furthermore, ethno-nationalist movements have not been rooted in historically derived immutable traits lind identities despite the claims of primordialists , but rather on the shifting sands of political strategies and circumstances. Increasing Baloch lind Pushtun access to federal levers of power during the past two decades has defused earlier regionalist movements. The Pakistan state hus thus been unstable not just because of its inheritances from the colonial era; it is in fact precisely the interplay between these and the response of the power elites to rapid socio-economic change within the country and to political developments worldwide, especially the "rowing strategic asymmetry in the subcontinent, which hold the key to understanding Pakistan's dilemmas at the close of the twentieth century.
Our opening chapter provides the reader with both an introduction to Pakistan's geopolitical, economic and social setting and an overview of the changes and challenges since the separation of Bangladesh in lIn I. Chapter 2 focuses on the administrative, economic and political legacies of British rule in the regions which were to form Pakistan, while Chapter 3 examines the character and legacies of the Pakistan movement. This is followed by a brief study of the seemingly insurmountable problems which faced Pakistan on its creation.
Two key 'Illest ions are raised.
How was Pakistan able to overcome the difficulties which threatened to strangle it at birth? And in what ways did the crisis management of influence the state's future political trajeclory? Chapter 5 surveys the chaotic political period which culminated III the military coup of It draws out both the causes and significance Ill' the Muslim League's collapse and also looks at the establishment Ill' the close strategic ties with the United States.
There then follows assessment of the successes and ultimate failures of the Ayub era. The Bangladesh breakaway is analysed in Chapter 7 in terms of both the depoliticisation and economic imbalances of the Ayub era and East Bengal's longer term history. Chapter 8 sets the ultimate failure of the populist interlude of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in its regional and international historical context. Particular attention is drawn to the regime's economic and political reforms and to centre-province relations.
The next chapter examines Zia's Pakistan and its legacy for the contemporary period, focusing on both the Islamisation process and the changing international context. The final two chapters seek to explain why democratisation in Pakistan since has gone hand in hand with a growing crisis of governability. The historic roots of Pakistan's zero-sum politics are examined along with the constraints placed upon the state by the late-twentieth-century new world order and economic globalisation.
MuCh oftlu:!. Pakistan's resulting ties with America and, to a much smaller extent, with China have profoundly influenced its internal politics. Pakistan's geopolitical situation in the new world order of the early s seemed more favourable than at any period since the secession of East Pakistan.
The military threat of the former Soviet Union had been removed and India could no longer rely on it for diplomatic and economic assistance or for supplies of cheap weapons.
The emergence of the six Central Asian republics further opened up the possibility of economic, cultural and commercial links. It seemed as though this was about to be realised early in following a series of agreements on troop movements and the opening of air corridors. Pakistan's hopes dissolved in the chaos of post-communist Afghanistan and in the intensification of the cold war with India.
The turbulence in Afghanistan threatened not only an overspilling of violence into the Pushtun areas of the Frontier, but closed off the trade route from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea at Karachi. Iran increasingly emerged as an alternative trade outlet. The unofficial Pakistani support for the Taliban movement in Afghanistan must be viewed in the light of trade as much as Islamic policy.
New Delhi continuously claimed that Pakistan was waging a covert war in Kashmir and that its Inter Services Intelligence Agency lSI had planted the bombs which killed people in Bombay in March The continued deterioration of relations in culminated in the closure of the two country's consulates in Bombay and Karachi respectively.
This exacerbated the effect of the loss of the US military prop. But it has made only limited headway in comparison with regional organisations elsewhere in the world, not just because of Indo-Pakistan suspicions, but also tensions between India and Sri Lanka and even India and Nepal.
The Politics of Confrontation', Asian Survey 35, no. Winners and Losers', Asian Survey 35, I no. In socio-economicterllls Pakistan can bebest typified as apopulous, rapidlygrowing middle income country in. Arable land stIll renlains tlie principal natural resource with 25 per cent Of the country's total area under cultivation thanks to one of the most extensive irrigation systems in the world.
However, social welfare has lagged behind economic growth, bringing--wTih it marked rural-urban and gender disparities. Again, as in many developing countries, external and internal budget deficits are high.
The country's population was estimated at millioIl in with an annual increase of 3 per cent, one of the highest in the world. Rapid rates of economic growth 6. Social welfare has lagged behind Pakistan's considerable economic progress since independence. This is demonstrated most starkly by such figures as 26 per cent literacy and an infant mortality rate of 97 out of births in Life expectancy stands at fifty-nine for both men and women.
Gender inequalities are particularly marked in education where only 11 per cent of Pakistani women are literate and only a tenth of school-age girls in the countryside receive education.
Despite attempts at diversification, cotton textiles and clothing account foraDout 50 per cent of all exports. By t hey appeared increasingly unwilling to bail Pakistan out of its debt. The crisis which coincided with the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's second government was narrowly averted byrecourse to short term high interest. However its Islam is not monolithic or for that matter monochrome, with significant sectarian differences and a lively Sufi tradition. Outside the tribal areas, the main social networks are formed by biraderis and Sufi brotherhoods.
The countryside, especially in Sindh and southwestern Punjab, is marked by uneven feudal power relationships. Society is strictly patriarchal.
Competing with these social forces and identities in political mobilisation have been ethnic loyalties. These are grounded in both linguistic and cultural inheritances and a sense that Punjabis have controlled the Pakistan state apparatus to the disadvantage of others.
Together all these influences, many of which were reinforced during the period of colonial rule, have established a political culture which is inimical to the growth of a participant democracy. In keeping with the major concerns of this work, special attention will be paid in this chapter both to the inheritances from the colonial state and the changes brought about by the separation of East Pakistan in The chapter will conclude by examining Pakistan's postindependence socio-economic development.
East Bengal, which until comprised one-sixth of Pakistan's total area, was a monsoon-saturated delta land which extended some miles north of the Bay of Bengal.
Most of the province was barely above sea-level, broken only by a narrow band of hills along the Burmese border. It contrasted with West Pakistan not only in topography and climate, but in population density and religious composition.
East Pakistan contained over half of the state's total population some 45 million in , the 1,plus people per square mile making it one of the most densely settled regions of the world.
Even in the most thickly populated rural areas of West Pakistan, the density was no more than people per square mile. While just under 3 per cent of West Pakistan's population was non-Muslim according to the Census, the figure for the eastern wing was 23 per cent. The relative sizes of the two wings' minority populations inevitably influenced responses to the issue of Islamisation.
This distance from the seat of national power compounded the problem of forging a sense of national identity which could reach across regional, linguistic and religious difIerences. The economic imbalances between West and East Pakistan uiso hindered national integration.. Economies of scale and the siting of the federal capital Tn West Pakistan perpetuated the inter-wing imbalance, and as the result there were destabilising political repercussions.
Peasant proprietors predominated in East Bengal where just under a half of the cultivable area was owned by families having 5 acres or Icss. Sindh and parts of the Punjab possessed large landed estates.
Differing political priorities and styles emanated from the societies of the eastern and western wings. The Bengalis' more radical and democratic urges were denied in the realm of national politics because their demographic majority was converted to an equality with the less progresHive West Pakistan under the principle of parity enshrined in the lind Constitutions.
The Bengali elites' sense of marginalisation is clearly displayed in the following quotation from a speech by Ataur Rahman Khan during II debate in the Constituent Assembly early in I did not feel as much when I went to Zurich, til Geneva Language has acted as an important marker of identity and source Ill' political mobilisation in South Asia as is evidenced, for example, hy the Telegu movement in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh und the Dravidian movement and rise of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu.
Language politics rest first on cultural. H Cited in I. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Muslim separatism in colonial India was rooted of course in the Urdu-Hindi controversy in the United Provinces UP at the beginning of this century. From the time of Muhsin al-Mulk's foundation of an Urdu Defence Association in onwards, the Urdu language became a major symbol of Muslim political identity.
He opined that 'Pakistan has been created because of the demand of a hundred million Muslims in this subcontinent and the language of a hundred million Muslims is Urdu. J It is necessary for a nation to have one language and that language can only be Urdu and no other language. Attempts at strengthening Urdu as part of the nation-building enterprise proved counterproductive as was demonstrated most clearly in East Bengal. Even after , as Table 1.
In fact Balochi existed only as an oral language until after independence and was widely regarded as a dialect of Persian. P From the s onwards it was established as a literary. Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan: This decision, which alienated Bengalis, was taken because of the symbolic role it had acquired in the growth of Muslim separatism in India. Its relationship with the regional languages can be further examined in Y. Mitha, 'Linguistic Nationalism in Pakistan: Thesis, University of Sussex, Ahmed, 'Identity and Ideology in Pakistan: Jahani, 'Poetry and Politics: Titus ed.
In the early s Urdu finally emerged as a major political rallying point, but for a mohajir ethnic identity rather than Pakistani nationalism. Rahman, 'Language and Politics in a Pakistan Province: The Sindhi language Movement', Asian Survey 35, no. Language has formed an important element in Sindhi identity, along with territory and cultural traditions relating to dress - especially the wearing of the ajrak shawl of Sindhi design , poetry and Sufism.
Indeed it was Sufi poems kafi which helped to establish linguistic traditions, despite their ancient origins. During the era of British rule Sindhi was standardised in the Arabic script, formerly having also been written in Nagri and Gurumukhi. Sindhi is today the most developed regional language in Pakistan.
As befits a Muslim state created in the name of religion, Islam has exerted a major influence on Pakistani politics. What has been more striking is its divisive impact. Sectarian violence has become endemic in parts of Punjab. In order to make sense of the complex interaction between Islam and Pakistani politics, it is necessary to understand the conflicting Islamic ideological responses to the eighteenth-century decline of Muslim power in north India.
Islamic revivalism owes its roots to the writings of Shah Waliullah although modern Islamist understanding was formulated by Syed Abul Ala Maududi Both of these themes will be outlined here, in preparation for a fuller treatment in later chapters.
We can broadly identify four major responses to the crisis brought on by the loss of Muslim political power and the rise of an alien Christian rule. These are modernism, reformism, traditionalism and Islamism, often called fundamentalism. The institutions and ideas which they forged during the colonial era continue to profoundly influence Pakistani society and politics, as does their history of confrontation.
During the Zia era this was intensified as well as externalised towards the Shia and non-Muslim minorities. The modernist reformism of the Aligarh movement possessed a twofold aim; first to encourage Muslims to engage with Western scientific thought and second to reconcile the Islamic concept of the sovereignty of God with the nation state. The Pakistan demand was thus very much an Aligarh enterprise. It was opposed by both Deobandi reformists and Jamaat-i-Islami supporters.
The former were not prepared to compromise Islamic law by modernist reasoning and understanding, although they were in many cases unconcerned with the politics of the colonial state. Islamists were opposed to the creation of Pakistan, seeing the establishment of a secular Muslim nation-state as blasphemous.
Their disquiet had been increased by Jinnah's incorporation of the notion of discretion in choosing between Islamic law and customary law during the passage of the Muslim Personal Law Bill in the Central Legislature in Even at this juncture however the perpetual disunity in the ranks of the 'ulama undermined their attempts to transform Pakistan into an 'ideological state'.
In addition to the Sunni-Shia divide, 17 there has always. From the outset, it emphasised education and scriptualism. See B. Metcalf, Islamic revival in British India: Deoband, Princeton, Smith ed. The former uphold the 'traditional' Islam of pir and shrine, the latter represent the orthodox revivalist movement which aimed at purifying Indian Islam from such 'un-Islamic' practices.
The Barelvis, unlike the Deobandis hud unequivocally supported the Pakistan movement. Unlike the n it distanced itself from the Zia regime from the outset. Both modernists and those steeped in Sufi tradition have expressed hostility to attempts to create a 'mullahocracy' in Pakistan.
The uneducated and hypocritical mullah has emerged as a stereotype in Pakistani literature and in the folklore of the region. The pirs' popular religious influence, however, provides them with immense moral and temporal authority, and many have also acquired large landholdings. Their inlluence is rooted in the belief that they have inherited baraka religious charisma believed to be transmitted by a saint to his descendants and his shrine from their ancestors - the Sufi saints who since the eleventh century had played a major role in the region's conversion to Islam.
Relations between the 'ulama, the custodians of Islamic orthodoxy, lind the pirs have been uneasy. The reformist 'ulama of the Deobandi lind Ahl-i-Hadith movements from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards unequivocally condemned the 'un-Islamic' practices of saint worship at the shrines.
While one should not exaggerate the differences between pirs and 'ulama - an individual could be both an Islamic scholar and a mystic - the two groups have clashed both religiously and in their attitude to the role of Islam in the state. The Deobandi alim Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani was a notable exception. His followers supported the Pakistan demand through the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam which was founded in Calcutta in November Akhtar, 'Pakistan Since Independence: The Political role of the Ulema', unpubJ.
The Pirs! Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, New Delhi, The mass mobilisation of Muslims in would not have been possible without the support of the pirs. The 'ulama lacked th. Ayub Khan, despite his modernist outlook, sought their support because they provided religious fire-breaks from the incandescent attacks of Islamist groups and parties such as the JI. The pirs grouped in the J amiat-i-Mashaikh threw their weight behind him in the presidential elections. The biraderi brotherhood, kinship group forms an important locus of political authority especially in the central areas of the Punjab.
Patrilineal descent lies at the heart of the biraderi as a social institution although its boundaries vary with marriage connections, bonds of reciprocal obligation and political structures.
Biraderi solidarity has appeared strongest among independent peasant proprietors, although 'tribal' and landed elites deploy its idiom for political mobilisation. Indeed since the colonial era, biraderi identity has played a crucial role in local electoral politics.
Although the Muslim League stressed an Islamic identity which transcended the primordial allegiance to the biraderi, it could not ignore its political salience in the Punjab elections which held the key to the creation of Pakistan.
V Biraderi influence has continued since independence because of weak party institutionalisation in the localities. Its high point was in fact reached in the 'partyless' elections. However, the unequal rural power relationships inherent in the feudal system have, in the eyes of some scholars, been even more int1uential in shaping Pakistani politics than Islam or biraderi loyalties. A vast economic and social gulf exists between the landholding elite and the rural masses.
Indeed the continued power of the feudal elite. Only Pir Taunsa supported Fatima Jinnah who opposed him in the election. See S. Donnan and P. Werbner eds , Economy and Culture in Pakistan Basingstoke, , pp. IN seen as Pakistan's bane by the professional classes. P The state's existence is owed neverthless to the Muslim League's strategic alliances with the large landholders. During Pakistan's opening turbulent decades, the landlords exerted a dominant influence which prevented effective lund reform and hindered economic and political development within the countryside.
The full sway of the landlords' power was displayed III provincial politics, but their predominance was also reflected in uurional politics. In the and National Assemblies landlords uccounted for 58 out of 96 and 34 out of 82 members respectively. It could also be used to veto administrative and socio-economic reform in the localities. Votes were sought in an atmosphere of both 'coercive localism' and extravagant display.
Critics of Pakistani 'feudalism' have produced a threefold charge sheet arising from the landholders' predominance: As the causes of the secession are examined later, it is suffitient merely to draw attention here to its main demographic, religious and political legacies before turning to the rapid socio-economic change of the past two decades. The secession of East Pakistan reinforced Punjabi domination of the state. Table 1. The region' s. B For a typical assessment see LH.
Consequently rigid adherence to a policy or a measure is likely to make politicians less available for office. Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study London, t p, Karachi Karachi 5, Baxter et al.
Boulder, p. Ilf factor,27 and OmarNoman has similarly linked the political tranquility of the Punjab during the Zia era to the prosperity arising from migrants' remittances. Its absence in the interior of Sindh, which sent no migrants to the Gulf, undoubtedly contributed to the sense of relative deprivation which fuelled the anti-Zia protests.
Punjab's big brother status in the post Pakistan state has been a cause of increasing resentment among Sindhi, Baloch, Pushtun and mohajir nationalists. Piscatori, 'Asian Islam:. International Linkages and their Impact on International Relations' in 1. Esposito ed.
Religion, Politics and Society New York, , p. Post ethnic clashes have been particularly bitter in Balochistan Sindh. Indeed it might be argued that the genocide unleashed in Pakistan in made later episodes of state repression in these winces more politically acceptable. What is most chilling in such. Parallels with the Nazi Holocaust immediately. While its perpetrators were brought to trial, the 'butcher' Dhaka, Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan, was to be rapidly rehabilitated promoted in post Pakistan.
State terrorism in the name of [onul security thereafter secured a political legitimacy with profound. The state's violent response to ethno-regional grievances and identities rooted in what has been termed a 'fragility syndrome' in the thinking thc ruling elites. It is based on a sense of increased insecurity vis-a-vis lin lind on the fear that ethno-nationalist movements in such provinces Sil1dh, Balochistan and the Frontier may follow the Bengali precedent.
These anxieties have encouraged lespread support in the political establishment for the acquisition nuclear weapons, as demonstrated in May Regarding Islamisation, the separation of East Pakistan contributed the trend in three ways: Ntrcngthened anti-Hindu and anti-Indian sentiment because of the Icnce given to conspiracy thesis interpretations of East Bengal's on; third it demolished the 'two nation theory', the secular stani nationalist ideology, thereby reinforcing Islam as an ideological.
These trends were encouraged by the oil boom the Gulf and by the Iranian revolution and Afghan jihad. The s backwash effects included increased militancy and the growth II 'kalashnikov culture'. Trade and investment have? See especially Chapters J, Piscatori, 'Asian Islam: P However, culturally and not le in security terms, Pakistan could not fully free itself from its SOl Asia moorings even if it wanted to. Adapted from unpublished data, Census Organisation of Pakistan , cited in C.
Baxter et , Government and Politics in South Asia, p. The interaction between Islam and politics during the Zia era forn a principal focus of Chapter 9. Yet we must note here that intolerant and sectarian violence have become part and parcel of contemporai Pakistani culture. Seventy-eight people were killed in Jhang alone from as a result of such clashes.
Muslim extremists' use of the legal cover provided by Section of the Penal Code" to persecute non-Muslims has contributed t. In October the Federal Shariat Court ruled that deatl was the only punishment for blasphemy.
Pakistan's continuing poor international image. Intolerance and violence received eneourugement during Zia-ul-Haq's regime, but are also rooted at least partly in the frustrations arising from the poor electoral performance III' the religious parties, although more extreme groups than the JUI,.
Il1P or II have been behind the spiralling sectarian violence. The II-. The Lahore High Court in December also acquitted another thristian who had been consigned to death row by a sessions court since November Alulladis as well as Christians have often been brought to court under the so-called IIll1sphemy Ordinance on the basis of a single complaint.
This provided for three years' imprisonment for the use of epithets and nctising of rights peculiar to Islam by non-Muslims. Cases have been brought even on issues as wearing a ring inscribed with Quranic verses. For further details of the episode see Herald, May Internet Edition , 12 February A number of leading local policemen had been suspended following an earlier incident 17 January in which a Bible had been desecrated.
The extent of the damage and the , of petrol bombs and grenades confirmed the suspicion of police involvement. Dawn Internet Edition , 9 February The most prominent figure from the Islamic parties, Qazi Hussain Ahmed of the 11, failed to secure election from both the two National Assembly seats he contested. The 11 boycotted the February polls ostensibly because of the caretaker Government's lack of progress with the accountability process.
Those religio-political parties which did contest did no better than before. Maulana Fazlur Rahman of the JUI had not only to contend with voter apathy, but had the indignity of being opposed by a voluptuous actress, Musarrat Shaheen, in his Dera Ismail Khan constituency. This electoral rejection of the religious parties has received much less publicity in the West than the dangers of fanaticism.
Indeed, one of its founder members, Asma Jehangir who is the present Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan acted as defence counsel in the celebrated Salamat Masih and Rahmat Masih blasphemy case. Violent episodes such as the retaliation for the Babri Masjid's destruction in India have instead grabbed the headlines. The system of separate electorates" implemented during Zia's time has decoupled minority legislators from their constituents and thereby further reduced their avenues of redress.
Islamisation and sectarian conflict have diverted attention from the role of pirs in post Pakistani politics. A number of them however, not least Pir Pagaro who is reputed to have a million followers, have.
In Provincial Assemblies it is the whole of the province. Christians and Hindus have four seats each in the National Assembly, while other non-Muslim communities have one. Ahmadis have not contested their reserved National and Provincial Assembly seats because of the way this would compromise their religious self-identity. The leading Ilgure of the Sindhi nationalists G. Syed himself came from a pir fnmily and founded the Bazm-e-Soofia-e-Sindh organisation which orwnnised literary conferences and urs at the shrines of saints.
Some followers claimed that his idea of Sindhu Desh Sindhi homeland was mystically inspired. At the other end of the spectrum of politics in Sinoh, Altaf Hussain, the leader of the MQM, is so highly venerated hy his mohajir followers that he is referred to as 'Pir.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, despite his image as a modern populist leader Nought support from the pirs. Added to the continuing problem of Islamisation is the ongoing influence of feudal politics. Although Zulfikar Ali Bhutto promised to nholish feudalism and introduce a more comprehensive land reform Ihan Ayub Khan, the political dominance of the landed elites has contlnued.
Feudal power relations have persisted in Punjab's south western region and according to government records even after the and land reforms, large landholders with farms of 50 acres and above Nlill owned 18 per cent of land in this area. Bhutto himself turned Ii the landowners in the elections.
The power of the wadero" hus remained a constant feature of Sindh' s politics. Regional and national parties alike have drawn their leadership from this class in the Sindhispeaking areas.
When Zia undertook the civilianisation of his martial law regime, his hand-picked Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo from a prominent landed family of Sindh. A growing criticism of 'feudal' influence has centred around the. Syed, Pakistan: For details of Bhutto's 'veneration', see W. Richter, 'Pakistan' in M. Ayoob ed. Dawn Overseas Weekly, Karachi, week ending 4 January Wadero estates in Sindh can be anything up to 50, acres in extent.
Even after the imposition of a wealth tax in , commentators pointed out that it raised only the paltry sum of Rs. The influential English-language monthly Newsline, in an issue entitled 'The Great Tax Scandal' ,48 made much of the fact that the Pakistan President along with the chief ministers of Sindh and Balochistan did not pay any income tax because of their exemption as landowners.
Such articulate spokesmen of the agriculturalist lobby as Shah Mehmood Qureshi retorted that the landowners were already paying huge sums in 'implicit taxation' through the agricultural support price system which fixed produce prices well below the international market level.
The growing disorder which undermined Benazir Bhuttos second government in the summer of was directly rooted in the swingeing tax increases of Rs. Even the nominal provincial taxation on agricultural wealth which existed in Sindh, the Frontier and Balochistan was opposed in Punjab. The manufacturing-and service sectors have grown rapidly and become major employers. The production of' sugar" and. During the first four decades of independence, the number. Duties were increased on such items as beverages and cigarettes.
The clouds around the silver lining of his earlier assessment included the perennial trade deficits,56 budget deficits Rs. As a result of poor'agrIcultural yields, the country has been increasingly forced to import wheat and vegetables to feed its burgeoning population. Even after the loss of its eastern province, Pakistan's population of million at the beginning of the s was over 50 per cent higher than that of four decades earlier.
From Crisis to Crisis, Asian Survey 36, no. Kennedy ed. P" Despite the fragmentary data which is available, it is clear that the natural increase in population has resulted from the birth rate declining much more slowly than the death rate. Cultural conservatism and patriarchy have hindered family planning programmes and successive Pakistani regimes have failed to reduce female illiteracy from a scandalously high rate of 79 per cent.
Rapid population growth has hindered government health and educational provision which in any case received lower budgetary allocations than defence expenditure. It has also resulted in Pakistan, like many other developing countries, possessing a high percentage of children and young adults. Indeed around half the total population is under the age of fifteen. As such it is disenfranchised, for the voting age is still twenty-one.
The 'youth bulge' lies behind much of Pakistan's dynamism and violence. Ethnic riots, sectarian clashes, student fights, traffic accidents and violent tribal disputes over land and womenfolk equally attest to the Hobbesian jungle which is contemporary Pakistan. Youth underemployment has encouraged ethnic and religious extremism. Not only the rank and file but most of the leaders of the MQM in s Karachi were in their twenties. Furthermore the easy availability of weapons and drugs in a youthful society has created a combustible situation.
Violence and guns have always been a part of tribal society, and the cities of Punjab were no stranger to communal clashes in the colonial era.
But the development of the so-called 'kalashnikov culture' in the s was a clear break with the past. The flow of modern weaponry and drugs from the war-torn Afghan frontier into an ethnically combustible Karachi turned the city of lights into a latter day Beirut. The collapse of the state's authority in Pakistan's commercial heartland posed the most serious threat to national integrity since the dark days of It was matched by the turning over of rural Sindh to a dacoit raj.
Criminal bands established reigns of terror often with the connivance of the local authorities and leading landowners; The prudent even avoided daytime travel in many parts of rural Sindh. The growing violence in Punjab was rooted in sectarian. I The HDI was devised in by the United Nations Development Programme as a composite index of longevity, educational attainment and 'utility derived from income.
Thomas et al.
In the first eleven months of III one there were officially recorded in the Punjab over 3, murders and close on 4, abductions, mainly of children, most of whom were never recovered and fell victim to a life of forced labour, Pakistan has been a state comprising of people on the move ever since its creation amid the chaos of partition.
Recent decades have seen high rates of both rural-urban and overseas migration with important political consequences. The flood of migrants into Karachi in the s as a result both of a construction boom and of the Afghan conflict created the social conditions in which violence and ethnic conflict were able to thrive.
The roots of the unfolding Karachi crisis lay not in Sindhi-mnhqjlr conflict, but in tension between recent lower class mohajir residents and incoming Pushtun labourers. Sindh did not share in the other main source of migration from the s, of Pakistani workers to the oil rich but labour poor Gulf states. Migration to the Gulf has increased wealth and encouraged Islamisation through exposure to 'pristine' Islamic practice. Some commentators regard it as a contributory factor to the Punjab's quiescence during the Zia era.
Large numbers of Pakistanis have also packed their bags for Britain and North America. The political impact of the establishment of these overseas Pakistani communities has been twofold: The role of the Pakistani diaspora in national politics possesses some parallel. It is an area which requires much greater scholarly Inveltl. Their effects on domestic consumption patterns and domestic demand were equally significant.