We present a suite of security protocols optimized for sensor networks: SPINS. for SmartCards, http://www. caite.info Scholar. SPINS: Security Protocols for. Sensor Networks. Adrian Perrig, Robert Szewczyk, J.D.. Tygar, Victor Wen, and David Culler. Department of Electrical Engineering. memory constraints. – memory is not enough to store even the variables of standard asymmetric key crypto systems (e.g., RSA). – standard implementations of.
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Sensor network is a dominant technology among different wireless communication technologies due to its great deal of efficiency. Security is. As sensor networks edge closer towards wide-spread deployment, security issues become a This paper presents a set of Security Protocols for Sensor Net - works, SPINS. //caite.info  Steven Bellovin. Abstract. Wireless sensor networks will be widely deployed in the near future. Keywords: secure communication protocols, sensor networks, mobile ad hoc networks, MANET, authentication of wireless caite.info pdf.
Goldreich, S. When a node Figure 7. SPINS has two secure building blocks: Patel and J. Kahn and B. Bellovin and M. Therefore, WSNs need cryptography and their key chains.
The indi- protection. TinySec supports two different security op- vidual key Kum for a node u is generated as follows: Figure 4 shows the structure of the three types of TinySec packets.
The structure of the IV is where f is pseudo-random function, Ku means encrypt- dst AM len src ctr, where dst is the destination address ing message K with key k, and K m is a master key known of the receiver, AM is the active message AM handler only to the controller.
The individual key is used to secure type, len is the length of the data payload, src is the source communication between a node and the base station. Every node shares a pair-wise key with each of its immediate neighbors. Structures of three types of TinySec packets neighbors, and it is mainly used for securing locally broadcast message.
Then, it sends the and has a separate leakage issue when used with a counter computed key to neighbors. This key is a globally shared key that is used vironments and wireless communication.
Each node can easily Streaming, Loss-tolerant Authentication Protocol. SNEP provides data confidentiality, two-party data Instead of adding a disclosed key to each data packet, the authentication, data integrity, and data freshness. Before key disclosure is independent from the packets broadcast, encrypting the message with a chaining encryption func- and is tied to time intervals.
This prevents the attacker from inferring the plain- cally in a special packet. Using a time-released key chain for source Kencr, and the counter is C. The keys Kencr and Kmac are derived from the master secret key K.
Hash-chain was first proposed by Lamport  as a mechanism for one-time passwords. Hash-chain is based upon a public function H that is easy to compute, but computationally difficult to invert. The head of the chain, H1, serves as a commitment to the entire hash chain.
The hash-chain is generated in the order Hn, Hn-1, …, H1 and revealed in the reverse order. It is assumed that the Figure 5. It requires that the base station and nodes are loosely time synchronized, and each node knows an upper bound on the maximum synchronization error.
To send an authenticated packet, the base station simply computes a MAC on the packet with a key that is secret at that point in time. When a node Figure 7. Packet transmission based on hash-chain gets a packet, it can verify that the corresponding MAC key was not yet disclosed by the base station.
Since a 4 Performance Comparison receiving node is assured that the MAC key is known only by the base station, and no adversary could have We summarize security protocols in Table 1 with altered the packet in transit. The node stores the received types of attacks and major features.
At the time of key disclosure, the base station broadcasts the verification key to all receivers. When a node receives the disclosed key, it can easily Table 1. Summary of security protocols for WSNs verify the correctness of the key. If the key is correct, the Security Attacks Major Features node can now use it to authenticate the packet stored in its Protocols buffer.
Data and infor- Provides resilience and authen- mation spoofing tication Figure 6 shows time-released key chain for source RKP Data attack in Based on random pre- authentication. Each MAC key is a key of a key chain, transit distribution generated by a public one-way function H. In this paper, we described five security protocols for WSNs: Sensor networks are to become a truly pervasive technology that will affect our daily lives in important ways. We cannot deploy such a critical technology, how- ever, without first addressing the security and privacy research challenges to ensure that it does not turn against those whom it is meant to benefit.
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