IEC Nuclear Power Plant — Instrumentation and Control. Systems Important to Safety — Classification of. Instrumentation and Control Functions. Buy IEC NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL IMPORTANT TO SAFETY - CLASSIFICATION OF. DSTU IEC Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control Electronic Adobe Acrobat PDF, Microsoft Word DOCX versions.
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Differences between IAEA SSG and IEC 5. Develop 'bridges' between codes and standards for I&C. 15 safety classification. 6. References. IEC No. MSZ No. Title. IEC MSZ EN Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control important to safety. IEC establishes a method of classification of the information and command functions for nuclear power plants, and the.
Are you sure you want to Yes No. Planning of software verification tests. Prequalification is meaningful to perform in Figure 1 shows the main steps of the qualification full scale, if the system platform and the appli- and how it is integrated to the main steps of system cation are quite large systems and have typi- acquisition and development. Leittechnische Systeme mit sicherheitstechnischer Bedeutung. Cancel Save. Main normative sources for safety class 3 requirements shows the typical work flow of prequalifica- YVL 5.
LNCS, vol. Methods for assessing the safety integrity of safety-related software of uncertain pedigree SOUP. Report No: Smith, D. Functional Safety: A straightforward guide to applying IEC and related standards, 2nd edn. Elsevier, Butterworth Heinemann Google Scholar. Bishop, P. A methodology for safety case development. Personalised recommendations. Like this presentation? Why not share! Embed Size px.
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At least their platform is based intensive components standard FMECA is less on standard solutions and may be developed for applicable, because software failure statistics is many different purposes.
Some subsystems may typically incomplete. Software reliability and the be old and not able to qualify during the system probability of failures to occur may be difficult to delivery.
The only evidence may be their histor- predict, or even to calculate. Software failures can be ical development process and current operational common failures, making them even more critical history.
They may have many versions and vari- than separately occurring hardware failures. TVO had the project management role, oriented qualification during the delivery process. As a whole, complete qualification can be very time VTT is the primary research party and is responsible consuming and expensive. FiSMA is As a result of the described development, there the national body responsible for software and sys- is clear need for an integrated and effective method tems engineering standards, including ISO 12 , to qualify software-intensive systems in nuclear ISO 15 and ISO 15 FiSMA is responsible for power units.
Some other standards the system acquisition and qualification processes have defined, for example, safety classes 1, 2 and to improve total effectiveness of the acquisition, 3 for systems, and safety categories A, B and C delivery and deployment processes.
There is no clear mutual compatibil- The objective of SPICE method is to evaluate the ity between various nuclear-specific standards and process capability. Also, criteria and require- Process Assessment standard.
The capability ments to validate achievement of the defined safety measurement system is based on ordinal 5-point class can be different. National regulators as STUK capability level scale. Basically any process can be want to and even must define their own require- evaluated using the measurement system. In most ments for the qualification process, to be able to cases, some predefined process reference model is carry out their monitoring and regulatory role. Also used.
Most known models are defined by ISO itself. FMECA is effective to focus on the The main phases of the qualification are prequal- most critical parts of the system that have the highest ification and application qualification.
If needed, nical data from system suppliers. Therefore, the also application qualification is done, partly with prequalification phase and necessary negotiations the same methods. As a starting point, a prelimi- with system suppliers run in parallel with qualifi- nary hazard analysis PHA is done as part of the cation planning. The suppliers are informed about user requirements definition step. Prequalification is meaningful to perform in Figure 1 shows the main steps of the qualification full scale, if the system platform and the appli- and how it is integrated to the main steps of system cation are quite large systems and have typi- acquisition and development.
For small As Figure 1 illustrates, qualification is based on a systems, some less effort-intensive methods are detailed qualification plan. A typical input is a PHA used if possible. The prequalification is mainly a based on user requirements. It is very important combination of detailed and evolved PHA, pro- to define the safety requirements early in the cess assessment and conformance checks against acquisition process for each safety-related function. Necessary When that is defined, the detailed qualification documents are reviewed as part of the assess- plan and tailoring of questionnaires can be done ment.
Also, verification and validation of tech- according to the requirements. A typical work flow of prequalification an essential part of the prequalification.
Figure 2 Table 1. Main normative sources for safety class 3 requirements shows the typical work flow of prequalifica- YVL 5. STUK Qualification during application and system IEC 61 Nuclear power plants — Instrumentation and development is done when needed.
As a process, it control for systems important to is quite similar to the prequalification. In most cases safety — General requirements for systems. Also, some additional requirements may control computer-based systems important for evolve from selected normative standards.
Some typical top- ISO 15 An exemplar process assessment model. IAEA Verification and validation of software related to nuclear power plant instrumentation and 3.
IAEA Requirements for system testing. Overall architecture of the system. System validation planning.