The prince / Niccolo Machiavelli: translated with an Anyone who picks up The Discourses on Livy by Niccolo Machiavelli caite.info Page 1. The prince / translated from the Italian by Luigi Ricci ; revised by E.R.P. Vincent. -- Discourses on the first ten books of Titus Livius / translated from the. Niccolo Machiavelli-Discourses on caite.info - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read book online.
|Language:||English, Spanish, Japanese|
|Genre:||Children & Youth|
|ePub File Size:||21.46 MB|
|PDF File Size:||19.69 MB|
|Distribution:||Free* [*Regsitration Required]|
Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli On the First Ten [Books] of Titus Livius to Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai. This web edition published by. [In chapter II of The Prince Machiavelli says that he will not discuss republics It is accepted that he is referring here to the Discourses on Titus. Livius, or at least. Free PDF, epub, Kindle ebook. By Niccolo Machiavelli. The Discourses on Livy is a work of political history and philosophy written in the early 16th century.
And in truth the prince who seeks for worldly glory should desire to be the ruler of a corrupt city. But from the head being removed while the trunk was still sound. Were any one. Of this we have a very recent instance. The Discourses on Livy is a work of political history and philosophy written in the early 16th century.
How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of Ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it.
That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for Misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their Ignorance or Want of Judgment, were not punished at all. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not delay conferring Benefits until they are themselves in difficulties. When a Mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to temporize with than to meet it with Violence.
That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic: Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and open Suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the Liberties of that Republic. That Citizens who have held the higher Offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower. Of the Mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice.
That often the same Accidents are seen to befall different Nations. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted.
Wherein among other Matters is shown how the same Causes may lead to the Safety or to the Ruin of a Commonwealth. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble. That the Multitude is helpless without a Head: That it is of evil example, especially in the Maker of a Law, not to observe the Law when made: That Men climb from one step of Ambition to another, seeking at first to escape Injury and then to injure others.
That though Men deceive themselves in Generalities, in Particulars they judge truly. He who would not have an Office bestowed on some worthless or wicked Person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good.
That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in Freedom, have had difficulty in framing such Laws as would preserve their Freedom, Cities which at the first have been in Subjection will find this almost impossible. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the Government of a City to a stay.
What a Prince or Republic does of Necessity, should seem to be done by Choice. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a State, there is no safer Method, or less open to objection, than to forestall him in those Ways whereby he seeks to advance himself. That the People, deceived by a false show of Advantage, often desire what would be their Ruin; and that large Hopes and brave Promises easily move them.
Of the boundless Authority which a great Man may use to restrain an excited Multitude. That Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body of the People is not corrupted: That when great Calamities are about to befall a City or Country, Signs are seen to presage, and Seers arise who foretell them.
That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust; whether those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were given without respect to Age.
Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or to Fortune. With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these were in defending their Freedom.
That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round about her, and by readily admitting strangers to the rights of Citizenship. That Commonwealths have followed three Methods for extending their Power. Of the Methods followed by the Romans in making War. Of the Quantity of Land assigned by the Romans to each Colonist. Why certain Nations leave their ancestral Seats and overflow the Countries of others. Of the Causes which commonly give rise to Wars between States.
That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the Sinews of War. That it were unwise to ally yourself a Prince who has Reputation rather than Strength. Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to await it.
That Men rise from humble to high Fortunes rather by Fraud than by Force. That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility.
That weak States are always dubious in their Resolves; and that tardy Resolves are always hurtful. That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of ancient Warfare. What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concern- ing it be just.
That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient Warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse. That Acquisitions made by ill-governed States and such as follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, tend rather to their Ruin than to their Aggrandizement. That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss. That in chastising their Subjects when circumstances required it the Romans always avoided half-measures. That, commonly, Fortresses do much more Harm than Good.
That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think to get possession of it through its Divisions. That Taunts and Abuse breed Hatred against him who uses them, without yielding him any Advantage. That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have obtained a Victory; for, commonly, when they are not, theft- Victory turns to Defeat.
That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth. That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have them hinder her Designs. That really powerful Princes and, Commonwealths do not buy Friendships with Money, but with their Valour and the Fame of their Prowess.
Of the Danger of trusting banished Men. In how many Ways the Romans gained Possession of Towns. That the Romans intrusted the Captains of their Armies with the fullest Powers.
For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be brought back to its Beginnings. That on occasion it is wise to feign Folly That to preserve a newly acquired Freedom we must slay the Sons of Brutus. That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live whom he has deprived of it. How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom. Of Conspiracies. Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and from Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without Bloodshed, but at other times reek with Blood.
That he who would effect Changes in a Commonwealth, must give heed to its Character and Condition. That to enjoy constant good Fortune we must change with the Times. That a Captain cannot escape Battle when his Enemy forces it on him at all risks. That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker than they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset.
A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity. Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army, or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain. Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and unex- pected Sights or Sounds. That one and not many should head an Army: That in Times of Difficulty true Worth is sought after; whereas in quiet Times it is not the most deserving, but those who are recommended by Wealth or Connection who are most in favour.
That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to fill an important Office or Command. That it is the highest Quality of a Captain to be able to forestall the designs of his Adversary. Whether Indulgence or Severity be more necessary for controlling a Multitude.
How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii, than all the might of the Roman Arms. How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the other achieved in Spain.
That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the gentleness of Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory. Why Camillus was banished from Rome. That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servi- tude. Of the poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman Citizens. How Women are a cause of the ruin of States.
How a divided City may be reunited, and how it is a false opinion that to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept divided That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens are about; since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under a semblance of generous deeds.
That the Faults of a People are due to its Prince.
That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to render signal service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy. How a City should prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy.
That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through every change the same Spirit and Bearing. Of the methods which some have used to make Peace impossible. That to insure victory in battle you must inspire your Men with confidence in one another and in you. By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a Republic are led to favour a Fellow-citizen: Of the Danger incurred in being the first to recom- mend new Measures; and that the more unusual the Measures the greater the Danger.
Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the Gauls, that at the beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards less than Women. Whether a general engagement should be preceded by skirmishes; and how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new Enemy. Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers can confide.
That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places. That Fraud is fair in War. That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by Dishonour; and in either way is well defended. That Promises made on Compulsion are not to be observed. That Men born in the same Province retain through all Times nearly the same Character. That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood and Daring often succeed.
How the Characteristics of Families come to be perpetu- ated. That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen to forget private Wrongs. That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave blunder, we should suspect some fraud to lurk behind. That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom has constant need of new Ordinances. Of the services in respect of which Quintius Fabius received the surname of Maximus.
Yours faithfully. May For in it I have expressed whatever I have learned. I send you a gift. And since neither you nor any other can expect more at my hands. You may indeed lament the poverty of my wit. Take this. But grant- ing all this. I know not which of us is less beholden to the other: I to you.
For Historians award higher praise to Hiero of Syracuse when in a private station than to Perseus the Macedonian when a King affirming that while the former lacked nothing that a Prince should have save the name. For men. I shall not fail to proceed with the rest of the History in the manner promised in my Preface.
Machiavelli Prince. To avoid which error I have chosen. Make the most. I enter on a path which. I find those noble labours which history shows to have been wrought on behalf of the monarchies and republics of old times. And although my feeble discernment. When I see antiquity held in such reverence. Desiring to rescue men from this error. This I persuade myself is due. For the civil law is no more than the opinions delivered by the ancient jurisconsults.
Whence it happens that by far the greater number of those who read History. I have thought fit to note down with respect to all those books of Titus Livius which have I cannot but at once marvel and grieve. Machiavelli citizens. And yet. I hope to carry it forward so far. And although the task be arduous.
I say. Among many cities taking their origin in this way were Athens and Venice. Cities have their origins in the former of these two ways when the inhabitants of a country find that they cannot live securely if they live dispersed in many and small societies. To escape the wars which. To escape which dangers. The city of Florence belongs to that class of towns which has not been independent from the first.
It may also happen that such cities are founded by a prince merely to add to his renown. Of this sort many cities were settled by the Romans. And by reason of the prolonged tranquility which their position secured.
Settlers of this sort either establish themselves in cities Cities like these. The origin of cities may be said to be independent when a people. In the second case. And since men act either of necessity or from choice. Such a choice were certainly the wisest and the most advantageous. And as for that languor which the situation might breed.
It is in this last case that the merits of a founder and the good for- tune of the city founded are best seen. Machiavelli which they find ready to their hand in the countries of which they take possession.
But since to be safe they must be strong. The capacity of a founder is known in two ways: When Alexander the Great thought to add to his renown by found- ing a city. But in whichever class we place it.
And even in recent times. Dinocrates answered that he had not thought of that. Alexander laughed. It will be seen. To him. Dinocrates the architect came and showed him how he might build it on Mount Athos. But on Alexander asking how the inhabitants were to live. And because the things done by Rome.
I shall begin by treating. Machiavelli and its other founders made compulsory upon it. On the other hand. These as they have had different origins. For to some at their very first com- mencement. That republic. For it is scarcely possible that a State in this position can ever.
So that if the founder of a State should establish any one of these three forms of Government. It is certain. The good are the three above named. These diversities in the form of Government spring up among In proof whereof we may instance the republic of Florence. For a Monarchy readily becomes a Tyranny.
Machiavelli set itself to rights. Forthwith there began movements to overthrow the prince. For in the beginning of the world. Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius men by chance.
Next arose the knowledge of such things as are honourable and good. The multitude. Whence it came that afterwards. For observing that when a man wronged his benefactor. But the recollection of the tyrant and of the wrongs suffered at his hands being still fresh in the minds of the people. Machiavelli who. And because all governments inspire respect at the first.
For this is the circle revolving within which all States are and have been governed. For the multitude loathing its rulers. But this government passing. And although. The contrary. For where we have a monarchy. Wise legislators therefore. For it may be expected that in some sea of disaster. Among those who have earned special praise by devising a consti- tution of this nature.
Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius can have such vitality as to pass through such a cycle more than once.
It then only remained to assign its place to the popular element. So that Fortune. Machiavelli monarchic nor the aristocratic element was given a place in her con- stitution. In this way the tribunes of the people came to be created. And although the kings of Rome lost their sovereignty.
But let us now turn to Rome. For Romulus and the other kings made many and good laws. And such was the good fortune of Rome that although her government passed from the kings to the nobles. Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius due influence allowed it. In Rome. But no sooner were the Tarquins got rid of.
This dissimulation remained unde- tected. Wherefore it has been said that as poverty and hunger are needed to make men industrious. Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius are under no restraint everything falls at once into confusion and disorder. When we do well without laws. On the extinction of the Tarquins. For from the time of the Tarquins to that of the Gracchi. I affirm that those who condemn these dissensions be- tween the nobles and the commons.
And looking to the other circumstances of this city. I cannot indeed deny that the good fortune and the armies of Rome were the causes of her empire.
I desire to say something in opposition to the opinion of many who assert that Rome was a turbulent city. For though they be ignorant. Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius seldom gave occasion to punishment by exile.
But the demands of a free people are hurtful to freedom. Nor can we reasonably pronounce that city ill-governed wherein we find so many instances of virtue. And should any object that the behaviour of the Romans was extravagant and outrageous. So that we cannot truly declare those tumults to have been disastrous. For he who looks well to the results of these tumults will find that they did not lead to banishments. When this fear is groundless. Machiavelli readily convinced when it is told them by one in whose honesty they can trust.
We should. And if the popular tumults led the creation of the tribunes. We have. And because in every republic we find the two parties of nobles and commons. As touching reasons. If we look to reasons. Wherefore one who weighs both sides of the question well. Machiavelli destroying it. Nor was this enough for them. In instance whereof might be cited the case of Rome itself. I believe that. And more par- ticularly they accused the dictator himself. And so telling was the effect of these charges.
When his cause came to be tried he was acquitted. It is also to be said that their position enables them to operate changes with less effort and greater efficacy.
The nobles suspecting that the powers thus conferred were to be turned against them. Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius But reverting to the question which class of citizens is more mis- chievous in a republic. I note that when Marcus Menenius and Marcus Fulvius.
Machiavelli punishing their adversaries by despoiling them. Sparta created for herself a government consisting of a king and a limited senate. Of such republics we have an example in ancient times in Sparta. Venice has made no distinction in the titles of her rulers. For many persons. In making this inquiry we must first look to those republics which have enjoyed freedom for a great while.
For Lycurgus having by his laws established in Sparta great equality as to property. No ground. Besides which. Machiavelli together it became necessary for them to frame laws. And when in course of time there came to be many citizens ex- cluded from the government.
And this distinction could grow up and maintain itself without causing disturbance. Whence it resulted that as the people neither feared nor coveted the power which they did not possess. Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius equal poverty. But of this unity in Sparta there were two chief causes: Weighing all which circumstances. And this was due to the Spartan kings.
And had the Ro- man commonwealth grown to be more tranquil. Rome must have interfered with the causes of her growth. And he who looks carefully into the matter will find. In the former case he would have to shape its constitution as nearly as possible on the pattern of the Roman. In the second case he might give his republic a constitution like that of Venice or Sparta.
Were any one. Rome might. Machiavelli out running into another. For which reason in all our deliberations we ought to consider where we are likely to encounter least inconve- nience. So that to have created a king for life and a limited senate had been of little service to her.
So that if you would have your people numerous and warlike. For these. And were it possible to maintain things in this equilibrium.
But all human affairs being in movement. Venice in like manner. For there are two causes which lead to wars being made against a republic. For if. So that when we have given institutions to a State on the footing that it is to main- tain itself without enlargement. I can well believe. I veritably believe that herein would be found the true form of politi- cal life.
Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius cities also rebelled. I believe it necessary for us to follow the method of the Romans and not that of the other re- publics. In connection with the arguments here used to prove that the authority of the tribunes was essential in Rome to the guardianship of freedom. We must. But returning to the point first raised. Machiavelli together.
And since it is impossible. This might be shown by many examples. But Coriolanus. A law of this kind has two effects most beneficial to a State: There is nothing. In Florence. For when a citizen is borne down by the operation or the ordinary laws. Which ad- vice of his coming to the ears of the people.
But the matter being taken up by those whose office it was to deal with it. For when none such is regularly provided. Machiavelli punish them. In respect of this incident I repeat what I have just now said. For proof of which I am content to rest on this old example of Coriolanus. Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius upon as the foremost citizen of our republic.
And as his in- fluence had to be attacked by unlawful methods. I might also cite from our Florentine history the fall of Piero Soderini. So that in either case the bitter spirit which was the cause of all the disorder would have had an end. This was so well con- trived in Rome that in spite of the perpetual struggle maintained between the commons and the senate. But had there been proper methods for obtaining redress.
But many thinking him ambitious. For to form a tribunal by which a powerful citizen is to be tried. Although the examples above cited be proof sufficient of what I affirm. Machiavelli commons. But as the right to accuse is beneficial in a republic.
I desire to adduce one other. Aruns being unable. For he thought that in sav- ing the Capitol. But this displeasing the senate. The latter. So that. These asser- tions so prevailed with the commons that they began to hold meet- ings and to raise what tumults they liked throughout the city. The dictator. For which reasons the legislator should so shape the laws of his State that it shall be possible therein to impeach any of its citizens with- out fear or favour.
And as the Roman ordinances with regard to it were productive of much good. For calumnies sting without disabling. Where this is not seen to. Machiavelli sired to say with whom the treasure of which he had spoken was to be found.
In this passage we are taught how hateful a thing is calumny in all free States. And between them there is this difference. And there can be no more effec- tual means for checking calumny than by affording ample facilities for impeachment.
Those punished will have no cause to complain. Whereupon the dictator ordered him to prison. This matter. Hence arose the bitterest hostility between the friends of But whatever the cause of this failure. But had there existed in Florence some procedure whereby citizens might have been im- peached. For citizens who were impeached. Hence hatred sprung up on every side. Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius so the want of them in Florence has bred much mischief.
Of this. Messer Giovanni had the blame. Which calumny being fostered by his enemies. For any one reading the history of our city may perceive.
I shall content myself with one. Manlius Capitolinus. Machiavelli Messer Giovanni. As I have no wish to keep those who would know my views on these matters in suspense. But we must take it as a rule to which there are very few if any exceptions. On the contrary. This view would be a reasonable one were we to disregard the object which led Romulus to put those men to death.
I say at once. For this reason the wise founder of a commonwealth who seeks to benefit not himself only. And none who is wise will ever blame any ac- tion. This is seen later. And that Romulus.
Machiavelli undivided authority. And whosoever shall well examine the author- ity which Romulus reserved to himself. For though the multitude be unfit to set a State in order. Such a person ought however to be so prudent and moderate as to avoid transmitting the absolute authority he acquires.
For although the act condemn the doer.
But Cleomenes coming after him in the kingdom. In support of what has been said above. All which circumstances considered. I take one. I conclude that he who gives I might cite innumerable instances. King of Sparta. For while engaged with these reforms. Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius and constitutional government.
And the result of his measures would have been to give fresh life to Sparta. For he saw that the ambition of others made it impossible for him to do what was use- ful for many against the will of a few. Machiavelli new institutions to a State must stand alone. Romulus is to be excused rather than blamed. And yet almost all. Next to these. After these. No one. After whom come the founders of kingdoms and commonwealths. To all others. They would see.
And if he who has become prince in any State will but reflect. Phalaris and Dionysius. Machiavelli peace of mind. In like manner he will perceive in the case of Caligula. But were they to read history. Let him see also what praises they lavish upon Brutus. From the study this history we may also learn how a good government is to be established.
And if among those who died a natural death. And were the history of these emperors rightly studied. He will find the senate maintaining its authority. Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius of the west were of no avail to protect them from the enemies whom their bad and depraved lives raised up against them. He will see. Let a prince therefore look to that period which extends from Nerva to Marcus.
For during these times in which good men governed. But so soon as the empire fell once more to the heirs by birth.
Italy over- whelmed with unheard-of disasters. He will see outrage follow out- rage. Machiavelli love. But should he turn to examine the times of the other emperors. Let those therefore to whom Heaven has afforded this opportu- nity. Rome burned.
Were it in- deed necessary in giving a constitution to a State to forfeit its sover- eignty. And in truth the prince who seeks for worldly glory should desire to be the ruler of a corrupt city. And whosoever pays heed to an infinity of actions performed. Titus Manlius. He finding the people fierce and turbulent. The effect of this was to render easy any enterprise in which the senate or great men of Rome thought fit to engage.
But Scipio. Machiavelli seek this Marcus. And this from no other cause than the religion which Numa had impressed upon this city. For the wise recognize many things to be good which do not bear such reasons on the face of them as command their acceptance by others. Rome owed the greater debt. In the first of these two instances. And it will be plain to any one who carefully studies Roman His- tory.
We see. Romulus or Numa. Thus did Lycurgus. And this.
I think the balance must turn in favour of Numa. But since the lives of princes are short. But taking all this into account. I maintain that the religion introduced by Numa was one of the chief causes of the prosperity of Rome. And as the observance of the ordinances of religion is the cause of the greatness of a State.
For as Dante wisely says: Let no man. Whether in this he said truth or no. Machiavelli It follows. I take not on me to pronounce. The people of Florence do not esteem themselves rude or ignorant. And though it be easier to impose new institutions or a new faith on rude and simple men. This is easily under- stood when it is seen on what foundation that religion rests in which a man is born.
Wherefore the temples. For every religion has its root in certain fundamental ordinances peculiar to itself. All their other ceremonies and observances depended upon these. For which reason. The religion of the Gentiles had its beginning in the responses of the oracles and in the prognostics of the augurs and soothsayers. To which end they should countenance and further whatsoever tells in favour of religion.
Had religion been maintained among the princes of Christendom on the footing on which it was established by its Founder. These miracles were common enough in Rome.
It is from this course having been followed by the wise. But their faith and belief were wholly ap- proved of and confirmed by Camillus and by the other chief men of the city. Machiavelli them to keep their country religious. And the Church is the sole cause why Italy stands on a different footing. For no country was ever united or prosperous which did not yield obedience to some one prince or commonwealth. I desire to put forward certain argu- ments which occur to me against that view.
To the Church. And a still greater debt we owe them for what is the immedi- ate cause of our ruin. The Church. For though she holds here her seat. Of which we find many instances. The first is. Machiavelli subject to many princes or rulers. For this. And were any man powerful enough to transplant the Court of Rome. Taking occasion from this. I content myself with mentioning the following only: The Romans having appointed tribunes with consular powers.
For when. The hope of near victory thus excited in the minds of the soldiers. And although many such are related by Titus Livius.
Whereupon the people. Constant disturbances were occasioned in Rome by the tribune Terentillus. The nobles. And when. Publius Valerius. For first they caused the Sibylline books to be searched. Titus Quintius was at once appointed in his place. But Valerius being slain in the attack. In these cases.
Publius Rubetius. Their other contrivance was as follows: A certain Appius Herdonius. One other example bearing on the same subject I must not omit. Machiavelli being named dictator. And though the tribunes withstood him. And Titus Livius commends their behaviour when he says: And thus. If they refused. If the fowls pecked. Nor would they ever set forth on any warlike expedition. Among other means of declaring the auguries. It so chanced that as they advanced against the enemy.
For this he was condemned at Rome. After which he fought and was defeated. But some among the soothsayers having divulged to certain of the soldiers that the fowls had not pecked. For desiring to join battle. Where- upon Papirius began to array his army for battle. And that the event might accord with the prognostics. The fowls refused to peck.
But an opposite course was taken by Appius Pulcher. Machiavelli ment of the auspices the one had behaved discreetly. They then summoned the common soldiers. After offering solemn sacrifice they caused all the captains of their armies. Ovius Paccius. And because their allies also. Some who in their terror declined to swear. The first case occurs when it appears to the inhabitants that they do not live securely when dispersed into many and small parties, each unable by himself both because of the location and the small number to resist attacks of those who should assault them, and they are not in time the enemy coming in waiting for their defense: Of these, among others, have been Athens and Venice: In this they succeeded happily because of the long peace which the site gave to them [for] that sea not having issue, where those people who were afflicting Italy, not having ships with which they could invest them; so that from a small beginning they were enabled to come to that greatness which they now have.
The second case, when a city is built by foreign forces, is caused by free men and by men who depend on others, such as the Colonies sent either by a Republic or by a Prince to relieve their towns of [excessive] inhabitants or for the defense of that country which they have newly acquired [and] want to maintain securely and without expense; [thy Roman people built many cities, throughout all their Empire] or they are built by a Prince, not to live there but for his own glory, as was the City of Alexandria built by Alexander.
And because these cities at their origin do not have their freedom, it rarely happens that they make great progress and are able to be numbered among the chief Kingdoms. Such was the building of Florence, for [it was built either by the soldiers of Sulla, or perhaps by the inhabitants of the Mountains of Fiesole, who trusting in that long peace which prevailed in the world under Octavian were led to live in the plain along the Arno] it was built under the Roman Empire, and could not in its beginning have any other growth that those which were conceded to her through the courtesy of the Prince.
The builders of Cities are free when any people either under a Prince or by themselves are constrained either by pestilence or by famine or by war to abandon their native country, and seek new homes: These either inhabit the cities that they find in the countries they acquire, as Moses did, or they build new ones, as Eneas did.
This is a case where the virtu and fortune of the builder of the edifice is recognized, which is of greater or less wonder according as that man who was the beginner was of greater or less virtu. The virtu of whom is recognized in two ways: And because men work either from necessity or from choice: However, as men are not able to make themselves secure except through power, it is necessary to avoid this sterility of country and locate it in very fertile places, where because of the fertility of the site, it can grow, can defend itself from whoever should assault it, and suppress whoever should oppose its aggrandizement.
And as to that idleness which the site should encourage, it ought to be arranged that in that necessity the laws should constrain them [to work] where the site does not constrain them [does not do so], and to imitate those who have been wise and have lived in most amenable and most fertile countries, which are apt to making men idle and unable to exercise any virtu: And whoever had considered the Kingdom of Soldan and the order of the Mamelukes, and of their military [organization] before it was destroyed by Selim the Grand Turk, would have seen there how much the soldiers exercised, and in fact would have known how much they feared that idleness to which the benignity of the country could lead them if they had not obviated it by the strongest laws.
I say therefore that the selection of a fertile location in establishing [a city] is more prudent when [the results] of that fertility can be restricted within given limits by laws.